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ABSTRACT: The object of this thesis is to determine why the human rights discourse
has failed to usher in an age where the rights of man are respected, and what might be
changed in order to facilitate such an age. We move from a discussion of the classical
and contemporary versions of the human rights discourse to a critical examination of it
through the lens of Jean-Paul Sartre's later writings on ethics, politics, and sociality.
Through this analysis, we find fault with the individualizing and isolating aspects of the
human rights discourse, and conclude with a discussion of alternate social formations
that would obviate the problems inherent in the liberal democratic rights framework.
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Introduction
The human rights discourse is one of the most sacred aspects of the liberal
democratic system. It offers protections to individuals from the whims of the
state and other individuals. Always and everywhere, liberal democracies claim,
man is free to act without having these rights abrogated. Be that as it may, the
last 60 years —roughly since the UN Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1948 —
have been witness to some of the most horrific violations of rights. The
liquidation or attempted liquidation of large groups of people has occurred time
and time again since the Holocaust in the form of other genocides or attempted
genocides, unjust wars, state-sponsored terrorism, and low-level oppression.
That this is the case implies that there might be something wrong with rights,
that makes the rights discourse structurally incapable of delivering on its
promises —a perpetually deferred I.O.U.
In this thesis, we will attempt, through close attention to the later writings
of philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre on politics and ethics, to give a tentative answer
as to what the problem with the rights discourse might be. We will then attempt
to provide a speculative solution to it, with reference to the socio-political and
ethical insights derived from Sartre's writings.
In order to accomplish this task, we will begin with a brief overview of the
rights discourse: its origins in natural law theory, with Cicero and the
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, the development of positive
and contract law, and finally a more nuanced but no less problematic
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contemporary view provided by Alan Dershowitz in his book Rights from
Wrongs. Through the discussion of these texts, we hope to arrive at an
articulation of the necessary conditions of what a theory of rights should do.
In the second chapter, we take an in-depth look at Sartre's magnum opus,
the Critique of Dialectical Reason. In this book, Sartre provides a theory of group
formation and sociality that will form the basis of our later discussions of the
human rights discourse. The improved understanding of the interplay between
individual and society will inform our later discussion of the liberal democratic
rights discourse, in terms of how it grasps the concept of the individual and how
this plays out in terms of state power.
In the third chapter, we look to Sartre's undelivered and unpublished
notes for the lectures on morality and history which he was supposed to deliver
at Cornell University. These lectures, sketching out what ethics entails in an
existentialist framework, will be of immense use to us if the human rights
discourse is to serve some moral or ethical function, as we contend it is. By
tracing out the relation between ethics and freedom, we hope to discern exactly
what kind of ethics comes from Sartre, and how this might differ from the
definition of ethics more prevalent in common consciousness.
In the final chapter, we attempt to bring all of the insights from our
previous chapters to bear. We will trace out the ways in which the liberal
democratic human rights discourse fails to meet Sartre's definition of ethics, as it
imposes undue constraints on freedom. We will see how the liberal democratic

human rights discourse fails to adequately account for the nature of the
individual and society, and thus misapprehends the reality of the human, the
object of human rights. As such, we will show that the liberal democratic human
rights discourse fails to meet the necessary conditions of what a theory of rights
should do, as we outlined in the first chapter.
We conclude, of course, with the conclusion, where we draw out the
significance of our findings, and attempt to briefly justify our perhaps atavistic
use of Sartre, whose popularity has decreased rapidly over the decades.
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Chapter One: The Human Rights Discourse as it Stands
II n'y a pas de justice, en société, sans droit naturel ou civil qui la fonde. Il n'y a pas de droit sans
expression de ce droit. Que le droit s'exprime sans attendre et c'est la probabilité que, tôt ou tard, la justice
qu'il fonde viendra au monde.
--Albert Camus, L'homme révolté.

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to follow a selection of the different strains
of thought on human rights and to survey the various characterizations of the
genesis and nature of human rights upheld by competing theories, philosophies,
and meta-theories. The following pages will seek not only to put these
characterizations of rights in relief against each other, but to reason through
them, taking them on their own terms and pointing out inconsistencies therein
where these arise. The chapter will begin with a discussion of theories of natural
law and natural right—the idea that the source of rights is either God or nature.
Following this discussion will be a treatment of rights as they are thematized in
positive law and contractarian theory. These two will go together, since
contractarianism can be seen as a subspecies of positive law. Finally, the
discussion will seek to engage with a theory of rights that fits neither into
traditional variations on natural law, positive, or contractarian theories of rights:
Alan Dershowitz's process-oriented theory of rights, which is outlined in his
book Rights from Wrongs. The purpose of this chapter is not to have one of these
theorizations of rights prove itself as the "correct" theory of rights —a goal which

would assume from the outset both that it is possible to have a correct theory in
this matter and that there can only be one such theory —but rather to bring out of
each of these theories their best and worst aspects. This will permit one to gain a
clear idea of what criteria might make a theory of rights "better" or "worse" than
another, as well as preparing the way for the next two chapters, which will, on
the basis of these criteria, attempt to formulate a different schematic through
which to understand and evaluate rights.
What is to be gained from this survey is, then, a set of qualities or
characterizations that have withstood the intellectual assault, which can be
exhumed from the graves of various theories of rights, and which, taken
together, might form a cohesive theoretical framework in which to view rights,
or at least the sine qua non of such a framework.
Rights generally fall into a number of more or less discrete categories.
Human rights are seen as being the broadest, as they are not necessarily tied to
concrete legislation within a state. Civil rights are less vague, as they are
determinate rights laid out after being won or stipulated in advance, though their
exact content is often left to be stipulated by courts or legislatures when conflicts
between rights claimants arise. Overall, though, rights occupy a relatively
nebulous space within the legal system and its meta-discourse of jurisprudence.
Though the origin and nature of rights is often discussed, variously within
multiple legal and philosophical discursive frameworks, there is no single clear
consensus on the topic.

Rights are often theorized such that they fit into some few, rather broad
categories which characterize their nature and origin: thinkers within the schools
of contractarian theory of law and society, positive law and natural law all
attempt to make some sort of account of how rights develop and what exactly
they are. Within all of these categories, there is a rational calculus being made
between moral sentiments—theorized as either a sociological or anthropological
fact of our existence as human beings or as the product of nature or some deity —
and lived experience as the source of rights. There is also the question of
whether rights are something inherent in the person, socially constructed norms
the respect for which is imposed by a community, or else merely the stipulated
rules by which one must adhere if one does not want to suffer the consequences
for their abrogation, consequences which are also stipulated in advance.
Natural Law and Natural Rights
Natural law is an ambiguous term. By "natural law" or "theories of
natural rights" in this text, I intend only theories of law and legality which stress
that the purpose of law is to secure objective and external human goods (that is,
goods which are not generated by the subject, but prefigured either by nature or
a deity). Any law that does not aim at these goods or, more to the point, any law
that leads a society away from any of these human goods is declared unjust, and
may thus be ignored in good conscience. These theories of law, then, are such
that they are structurally equipped to make claims about the justice or injustice of
laws. For theorists of natural law, an unjust law is no law at all. In the Christian
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tradition, we may bring up the distinction from the Gospels regarding the laws
of man and the laws of God in order to properly and succinctly encapsulate the
basic dynamic at work in this theory.
Where the laws of man and the supposed laws of god or nature are in
conflict, an agent has a moral duty to favour the laws of God or nature over those
of man. Distinctions are thus made between true and false laws based on the
moral or legal agent's inherited morality —inherited, on the thesis of natural law
theorists, from an ineffable source. As Cicero says, "True law is right reason in
agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and
everlasting" (Cicero 41). The obligations imposed by natural law cannot be
repealed by any legislative body, because they follow from the moral sense that a
deity imbued us with or which is given by nature. Natural law is not
circumscribed by state law, though any tenet of natural law may be expounded
and enforced by the state. Natural law, according to Cicero, has "its origins ages
before any written law existed or any State had been established" (42).
The history of natural law theory being a long and complicated one,
whose complete exposition would fill much more space than that which is
allotted to me here, we will reduce our discussion of natural law to that which is
essential to it. The laws of any state may be broken without moral failure if these
laws do not conform to the laws of God or nature. Justice is to act in accordance
with these immutable laws, and injustice or corruption is to infringe on these
laws in any way.
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This type of moral reasoning about laws has been beneficial, perhaps even
essential, to those moral people living in putatively immoral societies. That
moral good can follow from what is formally and legally prohibited within a
state is not unthinkable, since it has often been the case that states or legislatures
are not founded on firm moral ground. The German resistors to the Nazi regime,
for instance those who were hiding Jewish people or helping them to escape,
were certainly acting in defiance of the laws of Nazi Germany. The fact that
these laws, aimed at exterminating a largely innocent segment of the population,
were considered unjust means that, for the German resistors, there was a metric
outside of the formal legal paradigm by which they could judge these laws to be
unjust. In short, these people were acting in accordance with a moral principle
which they considered both superior to and more fundamental than what laws
men had sought to institute. This is an extreme case, borne out of a state of
emergency, where moral considerations acted as trumps against those
obligations and prohibitions placed upon citizens by the state. Whether these
moral considerations had their source in a deity or in nature, this is an instance of
the laws of man being subordinated to natural law as given by personal moral
sentiments.
Jeremy Bentham, writing against the notion of rights as upheld by natural
law, stated that the notion of natural rights consists of "simple nonsense: natural
and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense —nonsense upon stilts" (Bentham
501). The American Declaration of Independence claims that human beings are

"endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," and that the
purpose of government is to protect these natural rights inherent in man (US
Declaration Ind.). The claim being made is that the authority of the government
comes from a divine source, and that secession is a valid course of action when
these rights are abrogated. The French Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du
citoyen, for its part, resolves to explicate, "dans une déclaration solennelle, les droits
naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l'homme” (Déclaration par.l). Applying as it does
to two foundational documents in the modern-day rights discourse, both of
which operate within the framework of natural rights or make appeals to this
framework as their basis, this polemic from Bentham should be taken as a serious
attack on the basis of the modern-day rights discourse.
Bentham's statement that natural rights are nonsense as well as the essay
from which it is drawn have been taken by some as being dismissive of human
rights tout court (cf. Bedeau 2000). This estimation of Bentham's intent is, to say
the least, spurious. A close reading of the text of Bentham's attack reveals that
his opposition to the notion of natural rights is less an attack on the notion of
rights themselves, and more the considered opinion of a great thinker on the
legal, philosophical and moral reasoning behind the theory of natural rights.
The doctrine of natural rights, Bentham writes, rests on poor rhetoric and
bald assertions of power: "it lays down as a fundamental and inviolable principle
whatever is in dispute" (Bentham 509). One can neither trust nor dispute the
moral sentiments of another, and, if these are to take precedence over the laws of
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man, then the status of positive law—the laws of man, stipulated by a
government—becomes suspect, and its persuasive power becomes extremely
limited. Bentham is not wrong to see the appeals to natural rights in the
Déclaration des droits de l'homme as an attack on government of any kind. Insofar
as the theory of natural law assumes that the moral sentiments of a particular
agent are such that they reflect divine or natural law, and insofar as any
particular agent might be morally corrupt, the appeals to natural law in the
Déclaration are ostensibly giving permission to corrupted citizens to ignore laws
which they might find inconvenient.
Furthermore, Bentham's text was not written in a vacuum. Writing in
response to the French "Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen", Bentham
was worried about the pretence that the drafters of the declaration thought
themselves so wise as to stipulate every putatively natural right in advance. He
was also troubled by the outcome he foresaw from the declaration, namely,
instability and continual insurrection in France. Taken together with a healthy
dose of nationalism, wherein Bentham may very well have felt insulted that the
French would declare that the rights that the French had decided on were the
natural rights of all men of any nationality, his antipathy to the doctrine of
natural rights in this case can easily be understood.

11

Contractarianism and Positive Law
Regardless, Bentham brings up a number of criticisms of the theory of
natural rights which should not be dismissed. He criticizes the second article of
the Déclaration for assuming that political associations are formed to protect
natural rights, on the basis that in areas where anarchy takes hold or in so-called
"savage" nations where no recognizable form of government exists, rights are
not recognized or protected, and thus do not exist. Bentham makes the claim
from this that the lack of government means the lack of rights, and that rather
than forming governments to protect rights inherent in mankind from the outset,
governments are formed to create the rights that it deems fit, so long as the
creation of such a right is "advantageous to the society in question" (Bentham
501).
This interest-based approach to rights, wherein the rights secured for a
people by their government are based on the best interests of a society, cuts a
swath between positive law and the contractual theory of rights. It is contractual
insofar as one could assume that a legislature could easily come together to
decide what rights would exist within their society based on a process of
negotiation coming out of the way in which they wish their society to function.
This would be in line with the theory of rights put forward by John Rawls in A
Theory o f Justice, or by Scanlon in various essays. Essentially, Bentham's
formulation, while not based on the myth of a social contract, is not inconsistent
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with such a view, and, as contractarianism is a subspecies of positive law, there is
a certain amount of overlap.
Bentham's theory of rights fits with positive law insofar as the
government in place stipulates what rights exist without reference to the "rights"
naturally inhering in citizens or humans in general. Rights, for Bentham, are
purely constructions of the state, and, moreover, constructions made by
legislators who have the best interests of the state in mind. Bentham's resistance
to the French model stems in part from his apprehension that this model will
lead to revolution, due to the broad nature of the natural rights invoked and the
notion that once a right is abrogated, revolution is a sacred duty. Since stability
is ostensibly in the interests of society and revolution is ostensibly against those
interests, Bentham sides with the state in its good will and better judgment to
decide what rights will exist, and takes for granted that this is the role of the state
and that the nature of rights is as a creation of the state.
The notion that the state works not in the interests of society, but in its
own interests, which might be detrimental to society at large or to large portions
of society, where "society" might be glossed as the interests of a specific ruling
class, is never broached by Bentham. That this might be the case, and that this is
why a notion of rights which would protect a person from the state would be
necessary, does not seem to occur to him in this text. It has often occurred that
legislators acting in the perceived best interests of society at large perform prima
facie injustices to minority groups, individuals, or neighbouring societies,

ultimately injuring the society itself. It has also historically often been the case
that the government was composed only of people from a specific religious,
economic, ethnic or linguistic background, and in the process of law-making,
performed prima facie injustices to people not of that background. Such putative
injustices, for which Bentham can take no account given his framework, can, in
fact, harm society as a whole. Take, for example, the internment of JapaneseAmericans after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Not only did this action, undertaken
with the intent of protecting America from the threat of internal enemies injure
innocent parties, namely the Japanese-Americans who were confined against
their will, it also hurt American society as a whole, since for generations
afterwards, this action was pointed to as a shameful mark on American history,
and as a contradiction of its stated principles of liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.
This type of argument is evidence of an important lacuna in the
contractual and positive theories of law. Contract theory is based on the notion
of mutual agreement between parties, and is evident in the works of Hobbes,
Rousseau and Locke, amongst others. On Hobbes' account, the contract
establishing the state is a function of the need to escape the state of nature, where
all individuals are engaged in an agonistic life, struggling against nature and
each other: the law of nature for Hobbes is that every man can use whatever
power is at his disposal to achieve his ends, whatever they may be (Hobbes 2005:
98). The contract is the "mutual transferring of right" amongst men, such that
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prohibitions on what a man can do to achieve his ends arise (Hobbes 2005:101).
Contract theory establishes the validity of the state in the mythical establishment
of a contract, freeing citizens from the state of nature. Contract theory only works
when there is an assumption either that the participants in the contract will work
towards something beneficial to all parties within a state at a given time, or that
the contract, as it were, can be renegotiated in response to the changing demands
upon a state. Otherwise, the intent of the social contract is being abrogated, and
has no utility to the parties of the contract. When neither of these conditions
obtain, appeals to the theory of natural rights become important tools in the
protection of disenfranchised persons, be they citizens or not.
Rights and the Right: Moral Sentiments as a Corrective
The utility of the theory of natural rights in cases like this, albeit important
in terms of the practical demands on a state of not committing grave injustices
against people who might not be protected by positive law, is not enough to
demonstrate the viability or veracity of the theory itself. If the theory of natural
rights is in some sense to be preserved, what must be shown is that this theory is
the theory best equipped to countermand the shortcomings of the contractual
and positive theories of rights.
Unfortunately for modern proponents of natural rights, of which there is
no small number, the theory of natural rights implies much more than necessary
to act as a corrective to the above-mentioned shortcomings of positive and
contractarian theories of rights. What is appealed to in the theory of natural
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rights is not the entire conceptual apparatus of natural or god-given rights of
man, with all of the metaphysical underpinnings and overhangs that are entailed
by this theory, which Bentham has already done a decent job of dismantling in
"Anarchical Fallacies". What is appealed to, inherent in the theory of natural law
but not coextensive with it, is the natural moral inclination not to do egregious
harm to other moral agents. This is a moral inclination, which can be divorced
from any legal framework.
What can then be appealed to in order to countermand the shortcomings
of the positive and contract theories of rights does not need to be the entire
conceptual apparatus behind the theory of natural law; one need only make
appeal to moral sentiments, one's inclination as a moral agent to avoid doing
harm, or the supererogatory inclination to do good. This, of course, opens the
discussion of what constitutes the good in a way that the theory of natural law
cannot, as, at least in the classical formulations of natural law, human good can
be discovered through introspection or revelation. Unlike natural law, then,
appeals to moral sentiment do not immediately trump positive law; they merely
open an avenue of discussion of the desirability of any particular law.
What is lost in appealing to moral sentiments rather than to natural rights
might at first seem important, but does not in fact cede as much ground as one
might think. Generally, one can say that the strong claim of natural rights is that
it ingrains as a fact inherent in humanity claims to dignity and a basic quality of
life that are quite often the object of politics. The theory of natural rights also
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stipulates that these claims are not simply the desiderata of a population, but the
obligation of governments to fulfill. Thus, the theory of natural rights makes a
strong claim regarding what the government must do. It does so in a way which
is rhetorically strong, but, as Bentham points out, weak in its logical
argumentation and open to abuse.
Appeals to moral sentiment as opposed to natural rights, however much
the two might overlap, clarify the relationship between injustice and the
abrogation of rights in such a way as to make these appeals valuable. When
making concrete appeals to natural rights in order to prevent or end an injustice,
there is a certain circularity in the argument, which Bentham points out, namely
insofar as the theory of natural rights posits as fact the principles in question.
What in fact occurs with such appeals is that injustice is conflated as such with
the abrogation of rights. Something is unjust if and only if there is a right being
abrogated; the abrogation of rights is injustice per se. The fact that theories of
natural rights emerge from attempts to combat injustice implies that these rights
are only recently discovered, but have existed since time immemorial.
The problem with the above line of argument lies in the fact that the rights
outlined in it are rather vague and also in that it is hard to make an argument
from moral sentiments to someone who does not share one's moral feelings
about a particular situation. One can attempt to justify an appeal to moral
sentiments by claiming that the perceived injustice involved abrogates a right,
but that right, then, cannot have its source in moral sentiments, which was the
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justification for many instantiations of natural rights. The United Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Man, for instance, justifies its doctrine of rights by
making an appeal to injustices which have "outraged the conscience" (United
Nations 318). This type of argument, that moral outrage necessitates and
grounds a theory of rights is, as we have seen above, spurious. As a justification
of rights, it enshrines as a legal fact exactly that which is in question.
Appeals to moral sentiment without the trappings of a theory of natural
right, on the other hand, seem to be much more useful, if still weak on a few
significant grounds. These appeals on their own, when not used to prop up a
nonsensical theory of natural rights, allow an agent to make a much wider set of
normative claims which might inform a given set of laws. Often in the practice
of law, one finds vague terms used purposefully in order to allow the law a
wider application. Generally, these come in the form of "standards" to gauge
whether a particular statute should apply. The "reasonable person" standard is
one such vague provision, where the applicability of a statute or piece of
common law is decided by comparing one's actions to that of a hypothetical
reasonable person. The reason this type of standard exists is the same reason one
might give to justify appeals to moral sentiment: namely, to allow a certain
amount of casuistry into a legal system which would otherwise be asked to
accomplish the impossible task of accounting for every possible situation a priori.
Arguments from moral sentiment would permit such flexibility in the
rights legislation: a standard based on the moral feelings of a hypothetical

rational person would empower the rights discourse to react to new and
unforeseen problems in a way which legislation where what constitutes a right is
stipulated in advance does not. Such stipulative procedures can, however, fail
horribly if the stipulator is short-sighted or uses infelicitous language. As a
result, unintended and undesirable consequences may arise, such as the
legislation not covering a range of actions which are obviously unjust and people
having no legal means of recourse against them. Arguments from moral
sentiment cover a greater range of situations, given the fact that the scope of
moral sentiments cannot simply be inscribed in law and thus stipulated in
advance. However, it is quite easy for legislators or people in power to not
recognize the validity of another's moral sentiments when they themselves do
not share them. The problem arises, then, that something is lost in appeals to
moral sentiment, namely, the strength of the obligation on government to act.
If the only true benefit of appeals to moral sentiment is that these last
provide one with a level of flexibility not given by natural or positive theories of
rights, but one loses the imperative force of the claim, then bringing in appeals to
moral sentiments as a corrective will cost too much. In fact, what appeals to
moral sentiment reveal about the rights discourse is simply that one must not
treat rights as natural or unchanging, in short, that the stipulative aspects of
rights are far too constraining.
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The Mutability of Rights and the Process-Oriented Approach
In order to preserve the strength of a theory of rights, one must not
jettison the notion of rights as such in favour of another category like moral
sentiments, but formulate a theory which allows or forces rights to be able at
least to respond to their unintended shortcomings and overcome them, or else to
structure social relations within a society such that these shortcomings do not
appear. As will be demonstrated later, the latter of these two approaches is both
far more difficult and the only one which offers the promise of satisfactory
results.
When one begins to consider how such a reformulation of the rights
discourse might play out, it becomes difficult to imagine that rights as generally
or historically conceived could be adequate to such a task. After all, is it not
precisely this inadequacy which has led to the evolution of rights as a historical
object over time? Is it not precisely this inadequacy which has allowed for
historical and contemporary atrocities, which are nothing if not monuments to
the failure of this rights discourse?
De jure, rights are stipulations of obligations and freedoms which regulate
individual and governmental actions and which form the limit to other forms of
law and to allowable actions. De facto, rights have an existence as a changing and
changeable historical artefact, entrenching in law different definitions of
humanity and sub-humanity, different norms and standards, different limits.
The discrepancy between the synchronic existence of rights and their diachronic
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existence—that is, the discrepancy between the universal, imprescriptible,
inalienable view of rights and the evolution of what is covered by this purported
universality over time —demonstrates at least a level of unselfconsciousness in
the popular discourse surrounding rights, if not something more serious. This
problematic is most apparent in the formulation given by natural rights, where
the rights stipulated in positive law do not correspond to some particular
person's notion of the ideal constitution, or to natural morality.
The contractual definition of rights, while more realistic in terms of how it
deals with this discrepancy, fails to account entirely for what these protections
are intended to do, often greatly disadvantaging persons who are not part of the
polity, that is to say, those who lack legal personhood and thus do not have a
proverbial seat at the table in the negotiation of the social contract. As Rancière
points out, and Arendt before him, these people are more often than not the ones
suffering the injustices rights are meant to protect one from.
Perhaps if one were to resolve the issues surrounding the stipulative
nature of both the natural and positive or contractarian theories of rights (since
both the natural theory of rights and the contractarian theory of rights include
the stipulation of rights in law, at least to the extent that natural law makes
reference to the state) then one might obviate the questions inherent in the
historical extension of rights. One legal analyst, at least, has distanced himself
from both the theory of natural rights and its contractarian counterpart. Some
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answer to the problems outlined above, then, might be found in Alan
Dershowitz's formulation of rights as process.
In his treatise, Rights from Wrongs, Dershowitz, perhaps not surprisingly,
claims that rights emerge as a response to wrongs, that the "source of rights is, in
a word, wrongs" (Dershowitz 2004:118). Rights are thus the outcome of a
"process of righting," (92, emphasis added) they are "nurtural" (86) rather than
natural. This characterization of rights as process leaves one with a rather less
substantial version of rights than either natural law's account or that of positive
and contractarian theories of rights. Rights so construed are not the positive
quality of a subject with innate dignity, god-given and sacred. Likewise, rights
are not the effect of the wise action of sage men, who, in their wisdom, stipulated
in advance limits on what can be allowed or prescriptions for what must be done
in order to have a well-functioning society. Nor are rights on this account the
effect of social contract, mythical, metaphorical or historical, whose outcome is a
balanced set of social relations aiming to protect everyone within a polity as best
as possible from the outset. Rights are inscribed in positive law, but the process
of deciding what constitutes a right comes out of experience, often the experience
of atrocities or wrongs which are deemed to be unacceptable.
Dershowitz claims that rights are shown in many cases to be the outcomes
of past wrongs, making rights ex post facto limitations on actions based on how
humankind has abused its ability to commit wrongs in the past. Rights so
construed are the last guard against the reinstatement of human indignity, a

safeguard against the re-emergence of the so-called inhuman within humanity.
There has been no shortage of wrongs, of inhuman or inhumane acts performed
by people against other people, and the threat of their recurrence is what
Dershowitz's theory of rights seeks to guard against. This formulation can also
be found in the thought of Michael Ignatieff, who stated that "the most we can
hope for" from the rights discourse is "to stop torture, beatings, killings, rape,
and assault and to improve, as best we can, the security of ordinary people"
(Ignatieff 2001:173). While Dershowitz and Ignatieff might quibble over the
nature of rights —whether, for instance, rights necessarily come from wrongs —
they share a minimalist conception of the goal of rights, namely, that of reducing
human suffering.
One can confirm that rights are generated as an effect of what Dershowitz
refers to as a "process of righting" by the historical facts surrounding the
appearance of specific rights in positive law. For example, the right to vote in the
United States has slowly been extended to more and more groups when these
groups have been in a position to claim that their exclusion from the voting
process constituted a wrong against them. Women and African-Americans, for
example, became voters after significant civil rights battles. The
disenfranchisement of these groups came to be seen as a wrong done to them by
a society which did not previously consider members of these groups to be
persons or, at the very least, full persons. Likewise, child labour came to be seen
as a wrong only after people began to lobby on behalf of children working in
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factories, claiming for them the rights to an education, to good health and safety
conditions and to a plethora of other things the abrogation of which the
economic calculations of the industrial revolution rested upon.
At times like those listed above, it seems absurd to claim that these rights
emerged as an effect of natural or positive theories of rights. If rights came from
natural law and these historical cases hold true, then one would be forced to ask
what the relationship between widespread wrongs generating the acceptance of
something as a right within a legal community and the access one has to the
precepts of natural law is. To be more precise, cases like the above imply that,
should rights come from natural law, the rights naturally inherent in mankind
would be inscrutable until such a time as their abrogation was recognized as a
conspicuous wrong. It seems to fly in the face of logic that a society formed out
of people with moral sense, in contact with a sense of what constitutes the good,
would consistently infringe upon that good. The certainty and immutability of
rights promised by natural law theory would here become suspect, and one
would be forced to develop a theory of the discovery of natural rights which,
while using a different jargon, would not be too far removed from the more
empirically sound theory of rights emerging as man-made constructions
responding to wrongs. Thus, the discovery of new rights in natural law would
amount, pragmatically, precisely to the process-oriented theory outlined by
Dershowitz, along with a series of metaphysical and ontological assumptions
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that add nothing, that complicate much, and which the principle of parsimony
demands that we jettison.
If one were to look at rights as a construct of positive law, one is faced
with a completely decontextualised version of the history of the emergence of
new rights, as positive law demands that laws be divorced from their moral
content and be seen as amoral general rules. One would lose the opportunity to
examine the sociological structures of how and why new sets of rights emerge at
particular times and in particular places, and be reduced to examining how
rights legislation correlates and interacts with other laws, statutes, and legal
principles. While perhaps not wrong per se, this approach would be inadequate
to any discussion of the value of legislation, its efficacy in terms of what people
want society to secure for them, or its impact on society as a whole. A view of
rights as simply or nothing more than an instance of positive law also limits the
possible discussion of how changes in public morality affect legislation and how
changes in legislation might affect public morality. The moral perspective so
important to civil and human rights is occluded in the theory of rights as positive
law, whereas its inclusion as a component in any evaluation of rights seems to be
necessary.
If rights emerge as man-made concepts after a wrong is recognized or
anticipated, the best traits of both natural and positive theories of rights are
retained without some of their least attractive qualities. From the theory of
natural rights, one retains the possibility of there being a non-arbitrary

relationship between morality and legislation, but avoids the problem of
claiming a source, be it divine or natural, for the moral side of rights outside of
human experience. From positive law, one would retain the constructed, man
made nature of law, but avoid the putative arbitrariness at play in legal positivist
discussions of law. In addition to all of this, such a theory of rights based on
wrongs would allow one, in an evaluation of rights, to introduce historical,
sociological, political, economic or anthropological facts into the discussion
without overstepping its bounds, which would be less than welcome in a
discussion taking place under the auspices of either legal positivism or natural
law theory—the first because its investigations into the source of laws look to the
legislative process itself, and the second because it sees such facts as contingent
and base, whereas it looks to a putatively higher and apparently universal
source. Such topics, which would otherwise be considered extraneous, often
influence what parties have rights, and which rights anyone has.
Multiple contentions can be made against Dershowitz's formulation of
rights as coming from wrongs, the most powerful stemming from what might be
termed the hereditary logic of legislation. Laws, be they construed as coming
from wrongs or as positive law, bequeath a course of action or a particular form
of social relations to society at large and to future generations living under these
laws, living with or without some specific rights. Since the wrongs which
generate a set of rights as a response might not stem from an immutable source,
the social conditions of a society might at any given time obviate the need for
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certain rights. More importantly, the visibility of wrongs, the ability of people to
recognize them as wrongs, is often conditioned by what was previously
considered right, meaning that this process of righting can be arduous,
inefficient, and late in coming to fruition.
The fact that rights legislation has never or rarely been able to keep up
with social changes in a timely manner, with new groups demanding rights, with
certain rights becoming obsolete, or with certain rights being coming to be
considered at a later date as wrongs is in large part why the theory of rights from
wrongs looks so appealing. These same issues are also why this theory is not
quite adequate. Dershowitz's theory of rights coming from wrongs means that
wrongs will occur, which is a realistic statement. It means that these wrongs are
necessary to the process of extending or creating rights, which is a pessimistic
and undefended assumption. Finally, it means that, without a clear prescription
on how to best undertake the process of righting, this process may be so late in
coming to fruition that it prevents or stops no wrong, but only recognizes a
wrong after the fact, which is less than the desired outcome of the rights
discourse, less even than Dershowitz's own minimalist conception of what rights
should do.
In a discussion of how a society should come to a set of rights, Dershowitz
mentions how much easier it apparently is to recognize injustice than it is to
stipulate what "perfect justice" might look like (Dershowitz 2004: 83). He states
that, rather than attempting to define an ideal constitution a priori, the ideal
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constitution might actually stem from recognizing injustices and setting up a
pragmatically determined set of rights to protect against the injustices that have
been identified (84-5).
While this is a commonsensical enough proposition, there are entire sets of
wrongs that could not feasibly be guarded against under this type of approach to
rights legislation. Take, for example, cases of systemic discrimination on the
basis of race or ethnicity, or, alternatively, social practices that might later come
to be seen as wrongs such as the existence of a minimum wage that is not a living
wage: these are injustices that are systematically hidden from view, either
through the ghettoizing of wronged parties keeping them literally out of view, or
through discursive tactics designed to occlude these wrongs, or through
depriving the wronged parties of politically legitimate speech. These wrongs
are, because invisible, unable to be addressed within the legal-philosophical
apparatus put forward by Dershowitz, which is based on recognition of wrongs.
The most his formulation of rights can provide is that, perhaps, someday, these
wrongs will have been exacerbated to the point where they can no longer be
ignored, and may then be rectified.
A wrong that few or nobody recognizes at a given time is no less of a
wrong simply because nobody recognizes it as such. Dershowitz himself
recognizes as much in his discussion of slavery, somewhat inconsistently arguing
that "viewed through the lens of experience, slavery has proved to be a
paradigm of injustice despite the contemporaneous arguments of its practitioners
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and defenders" (Dershowitz 2004: 82). Given his discussion of how the ability to
recognize injustices is indispensable to the righting process, the fact that this
ability does not seem to be operative at any given time —as evinced by the
contemporary defences of these wrongs and the longstanding nature of some of
them—seems to point to the fact that the sine qua non of Dershowitz's theory is
missing, at least in certain cases.
Of course, Dershowitz explains to his readers that now, at least, these past
wrongs are almost universally recognized as such (93-96 passim). This argument,
however, does not provide much help to any of the people entrenched in
contemporary rights struggles. In fact, Dershowitz's theory of rights as coming
from wrongs has as a basic and necessary structural element that injustices must
occur before one can set up a right against such a wrong. In short, wrongs need
to happen if we are to stop them from happening again. To make, as Dershowitz
does, a democratic recognition of wrongs necessary to the institution of rights is
to say that legislation should be decided on the basis of the whims of the majority
and not on the basis of principles, that government should represent and never
lead, and that, even where the prevention of wrongs is possible, reaction to them
is preferable.
In the case of same-sex marriage in Canada, for example, the fact that
homosexual partners could not marry each other was seen as wrong only by
44%, whereas slightly more than half of the respondents to the poll in question
believed that this constituted a justifiable infringement on the rights of same-sex
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couples, if such a right even existed for them. Many Canadians did not perceive
the marriage issue to have been a wrong1, and yet, the extension of this right has
already had an immensely positive impact on the lives of thousands of couples
who would not have otherwise been able to enjoy the state's recognition of their
union (along with the attendant legal and financial benefits of said recognition).
The case was decided not by popular opinion, not by the majoritarian
recognition of a wrong as insupportable, but by an appeal to the principles set
out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
For Dershowitz's schema to hold, one would need to problematize more
than he does the notion of the recognition of a wrong. One might need to find
that magical point that Hegel describes in his Logic where quantity explodes into
quality. Are the 44% of people who declared, with more or less enthusiasm, that
the absence of marital equality for homosexuals was wrong in some sense
enough to claim, on the experiential basis that Dershowitz lays out, that a wrong
has been popularly recognized, that this infringement of rights is not a justifiable
infringement but a violation? Or, does what happened in this case follow a
different logic, one in which the legislature can, in the absence of popular
support, declare that the set of social relations operative in a society is unjust,
and seek to redress this perceived injustice? If the latter holds, as I believe it
does, then we have put our finger on an issue that Dershowitz has sidestepped in

1 Polling at the time of the federal legalization of same-sex marriage indicates that 52% of respondents
disagreed with the initiative, cf. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/storv/2005/04/10/gav-marriage050410.html
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his theorization of rights as an experientially-based process of "righting"
recognized wrongs, namely, the question of whose values are those which
determine what a wrong is.
This criticism may be seen as anti-democratic, but in fact it simply points
to the fact that, historically as well as today, certain groups of people are
relegated to a position of relative or absolute powerlessness in the democratic
process. Slaves certainly did not have a say in any democratic deliberations on
whether slavery should be legal, nor in the process of abolishing slavery. Today,
especially in the face of such United States Supreme Court rulings as that which
allows potentially unlimited corporate spending in political campaigns under the
rubric of freedom of speech, the poor in the United States do not have a voice in
politics equal to that of the wealthy. For the democratic recognition of wrongs to
function in the righting process as its moral compass, one would think that
wronged parties should be given a voice at least equal to their perceived
oppressors.
For Dershowitz, the "reasonable person" is who must recognize a wrong
as such (Dershowitz 2004: 81). Agency in terms of the recognition of rights is
thus held at a distance from any particular agent, and instead inheres in
community standards of rationality, as the "reasonable person" refers to no
particular person, but to a hypothetical embodiment of community standards of
rationality. As we know, however, community standards of rationality are
historical artefacts, contingent on social norms and habituation to what might be
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termed from the position of a particularly arrogant external observer the
objectively irrational aspects of a given society. This is an issue which
Dershowitz handily avoids by such rhetorical and argumentative gymnastics as
claiming that "the verdict of history" has soundly rejected something as unjust
(Dershowitz 2004: 82). Agents prove things, and, unless one is a Hegelian, which
Dershowitz is demonstrably not, history is not a subject or an agent, and thus
lacks the capacity to pronounce a verdict one way or the other. To say that
history pronounces a verdict is either to confuse the descriptive with the
normative, to actually and heroically derive an "ought" from an "is," or else to
put one's own words in the proverbial mouth of history.
What is meant by such turns of phrase as "the verdict of history" must
simply be that some people have interpreted history such as to say that there is
now a consensus that the way some given event turned out is the way it ought to
have turned out. Saying, for example, that the verdict of history has soundly
rejected slavery is saying both that slavery itself has been wiped out and that the
obliteration of this institution is not morally contested ground —there is no group
making reasoned arguments, given the community standards of rationality, that
slavery should be reinstituted. History has no verdict, properly speaking.
Particular people, groups, and communities reach verdicts about historical
circumstances retrospectively, and Dershowitz, in a rather disingenuous
moment, attributes this moral and epistemic agency to history in order to give
the decision the veneer of objectivity, hoping that his readers will either be
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satisfied that the consensus reached by society on any given historical event is
correct or that the reader will be misled into believing that Dershowitz has
derived an ought from an is.
In fact, Dershowitz is not blind to the precariousness of so-called historical
verdicts, but merely inconsistent on the matter in a way that harms his argument.
He wishes to be able to simultaneously make two mutually exclusive claims. The
first is that the verdict of history in cases such as slavery or the Holocaust is a
closed matter —practices such as these have been "soundly rejected by the verdict
of history," remember. The second is that, because rights emerge from our
common experience of wrongs, an experience which is historically,
geographically, and socially contingent, societies may change their views on the
absence or existence of a given right at any time, which accounts for progress
over time. These claims are inconsistent with each other to the extent that the
second claim evacuates the substance of the first, reducing its persuasive power
to the generation of complacency with the status quo rather than convincing us
that the status quo is how it ought to be.
Concluding Comments
Throughout this brief and schematic analysis of the rights discourse from
these varying perspectives, we have seen again and again the emergence of
certain problematic elements which the theories of rights referred to are not
adequately equipped to balance. These problematic elements also happen to be
intrinsic to the notion of rights and their purpose. It is impossible to successfully
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put into practice a theory of rights which fails to adequately balance the practical
demands of its implementation against both the moral and political expectations
of what rights ought to do. We have seen imbalanced theories of rights fail on
theoretical and historical grounds. Theories of rights coming out of the discourse
of natural law empower individuals to act on their moral sentiments, placing
these on a higher plane than the laws introduced by the state, ignoring the
repercussions of acting morally but illegally in a state deemed to be immoral.
Theories of natural rights also largely gloss over the possibility that one's moral
sentiments might be in disaccord with what is actually moral. The fears that
Bentham expressed about the formulation of natural law put forward in the
Déclaration des droits de l'home et du citoyen, that such a formulation subordinating
the legitimacy of the state to the rights of the individual citizen would lead to
anarchy, are an inescapable aspect of theories of natural rights.
Positive law's account of rights is no less unbalanced than that of natural
law, opting to ignore the desirability, moral permissibility, or efficiency of any
set of rights, and to instead inquire into their status as something which is
posited by state power. For classical legal positivism, as it is found in Bentham
and John Austin, talk of rights, obligations, et caetera is nothing more than a
normative gloss on statements which actually, in non-normative terms, describe
relations of obedience and power. The purely descriptive angle which legal
positivism takes on the rights discourse largely ignores anything like the best
interests of society as a whole or the well-being of particular members of society.
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The largest constraint on sovereign power seems to be public opinion in the form
of the threat of uprising. This discourse thus replaces the discourse of legitimacy
with that of legality, broadly construed as that which is posited by the person or
group that is best able to subordinate others to its will, either by charisma, force
of arms, or a veneer of legitimacy generated through historical circumstance (e.g.,
hereditary rule). In positive law, there is no question, then, of rights as a
safeguard against abuses of power should those abuses fall within the purview
of positive law, which is what many modern theorists and advocates of human
rights boast as the main purpose of the rights discourse.
As we have also seen, contractarian theories of rights, which give accounts
of positive law in terms of its ability to provide the best outcome for all members
of society, fail in their attempts to balance the moral and political, normative
elements of a theory of rights against the practical reality of enforcing and
optimizing its formulation. Part of this failure is a function of the fact that,
historically, social contracts have unduly benefitted certain parties over others,
by failing to give moral and political consideration to parties that would —
sometimes much later and only after suffering atrocities —force their claims of
full personhood or leave the state. The mythological basis of certain accounts of
the social contract, while failing to accurately describe the genesis and nature of
the laws and rights provided for in a society, have nonetheless given a sense of
legitimacy to these false or faulty apologies for the state.

Dershowitz's theory of rights, which is similar to some forms of the
contract theory but which sees the nature of rights as undergoing continual
renegotiation on the basis of wrongs, subordinates the moral character of the
rights discourse to its political character, subjecting the moral character to
democratic review, and thus weakening the strong claim of rights as a trump
against the will of the majority. Since, historically, at least in terms of the modern
revival of the international rights discourse after World War II, what was asked
of the human rights discourse is that it protect the subjects of a state against
abuses of state power, and since many if not most of these abuses have been
against minority groups within the state or against outsiders, Dershowitz's
account of the evolution of rights and his formulation of how rights must work
seems to evacuate of all substance the strongest argument for having a human
rights discourse at all.
We can conclude that any successful theory of rights should balance the
pragmatic necessities involved in the implementation of a practice of rights
against the moral and political demands, against, in short, the normative
character of what rights ought to do, how they ought to operate, and what they
ought to secure. This conclusion is certainly the premise on which many theories
of rights are based, indeed, we can see in the formulations of rights provided by
every thinker mentioned above, from Cicero and Bentham to Dershowitz, a
similar calculation at work. The following chapters will attempt to situate this
calculation, this balancing act, in a different theoretical context, which will both
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complicate the discussion of rights —though not needlessly —and lead us to a
conception and program of rights which avoids the bloody pitch where these
other theories have fallen.

37

Chapter Two: Sartre’s Critique o f D ialectical Reason.
“L 'enfer, c 'est les Autres

2

Introduction and Key Concepts: The Dialectic, Scarcity and the Practico-Inert
This chapter will deal with the exposition and argumentation of Jean-Paul
Sartre's socio-political theory from his Critique o f Dialectical Reason23, which will
then be put to use in order to develop a theory of human rights consistent with
his general socio-political theory in the final chapter. In the CDR, Sartre
theorizes the history of society and its ontic and ontological underpinnings
through the lens of the dialectic. Through the course of his dialectical analysis of
social and political formations, he articulates in an intelligible way the means by
which groups form against a background of antagonistic circumstances: the
scarcity of materials naturally occurring in the world, the resistance posed to free
purposive action posed by historical formations of social and political practices,
and the antagonistic actions of other groups, for instance. From a starting point
of the individual existing in a world of pre-established social relations —the
family, the government, intra-state groups, and others—Sartre explains how
freedom operates in the world to negate antagonistic circumstances, and how
this freedom can then be turned against itself in the development of different
repressive structures. This chapter, then, will critically examine certain key
2 Sartre, Jean-Paul (1987). Huis Clos. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 95.
3 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Critique of Dialectical Reason. Vol.l. Ed. Jonathan Rèe. Trans. Alan
Sheridan-Smlth. New York: Verso, 2004. Hereafter, the Critique of Dialectical Reason will be referred to
as CDR.
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concepts in the CDR, notably scarcity, individual praxis, the practico-inert and
group praxis. These concepts contribute to his analysis of different social
formations, namely, the individual, the group-in-fusion, the pledged group, the
organization, and the institution, which form the basic types of groups that can
exist in any society. In later chapters, we will use this description of sociality to
criticize the ways in which the liberal democratic human rights discourse
conceives of the individual and of social relations.
Over the course of the CDR, Sartre puts forward multiple defences of the
necessity of the dialectic, some of which will be presented in this chapter. These
defences cannot come from an a priori form of argumentation, since Sartre's
notion of the dialectic takes the form of a nominalist materialistic dialectic. While
the popular notion of the dialectic can be summarized as the movement from
thesis to antithesis to synthesis, this notion mistakes the mechanism of dialectics
with the notion of the dialectic proper. For Sartre, as well as for Marx and Hegel,
the fundamental, minimalist, sine qua non, notion necessary for it to be said that
the dialectic exists is simply the co-mediation of object and subject in a system of
internal relations. The dialectic thus differentiates itself from analytic rationality
insofar as it rules out the possibility that an object can exist outside of its system
of concrete internal bonds, or that it can be adequately conceptualized outside of
this system of relations. The movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis is
one mechanism by which this co-mediation can and often does unfold, but this
movement is not the dialectic itself. An object or a subject is never completely
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self-identical or self-subsistent: its identity is determined in its relations to other
objects or subjects and consists in this interrelation.
That this statement about the dialectic is the case, and that the common
notion of dialectics is somewhat inaccurate, can be shown by a brief foray into
Hegelian thought. Such a fact is important, since it is the conflation of the
dialectic as a whole with this triadic movement that lends itself to mechanistic or
deterministic interpretations and uses of the dialectic, which is certainly not the
operative dialectical framework at play in the CDR.
Hegel himself rarely used the words "thesis," "antithesis," and
"synthesis" to describe his notion of the dialectic, nor their closest German
counterparts. Instead, he varied between the triads Abstract-Negative-Concrete
and Immediate-Mediated-Concrete (cf. Kainz 1996). These formulations imply
something important about Hegel's system that is missing in the thesisantithesis-synthesis formulation, namely, the why of this dialectical movement.
Why does every thesis generate its antithesis? The movement of the Hegelian
dialectic is the movement from the subject-object problematic to the concrete. Of
course, for Hegel, the concrete is that which approximates to thought or is
"thought-constituted" whereas the abstract is that which enjoys "isolated
existential immediacy" (Kainz 1976153n.l9). In the movement towards the
concrete, the subject-object problematic is ostensibly resolved by the clarification
of the inseparability of subject and object, and comes back into view at a higher
level of intelligibility.
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While it is obvious that in the work of materialist thinkers such as Marx
and the later Sartre, the notion of the concrete is not one of approximation to
thought, but one of adequacy to the material and social situation, the movement
from their respective notions of the abstract to their respective notions of the
concrete is nonetheless preserved from Hegelian dialectics in its materialist
reformulations. That being said, we can once more state that the fundamental
notions of the dialectic, as the dialectic appears in the social world, are the
interpenetration of opposites (object-subject, thought-being), affirmation rising
out of the negation of the negation, and the transformation of quantity into
quality4.
In a passage that would be puzzling outside of this framework, and is for
that reason often overlooked, Sartre defends, by way of a discussion of
Durkheim, the idea that the subject and the object are co-determined. At the
birth of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim wrote that sociologists must
"consider social facts as things" (Durkheim 1938:14). For Sartre, quite rightly,
this is only true to the extent that things are social facts: "social facts are things in
so far as all things are, directly or indirectly, social facts" (Sartre 2004:179). This
chiasmatic reversal is more than Sartre attempting to channel the wit of a Mae
West character. It is, in fact, a statement of the reciprocity that exists between the

4 The earlier comments on this transformation in relation to Dershowitz's reasoning were not meant to
lambast the notion of the transformation of quantity into quality as such, only to imply that, outside of
the notion of the dialectic, which is to say, within the logic of analytical reason, this transformation has
neither a rigorous theoretical foundation, nor an experiential basis: it appears, within analytic reason, as
magic.
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social world and the physical world, between subjects and objects, and this
reciprocity sets up a methodological univocity —if not equivalence—between the
two purportedly discrete worlds of things and social facts. Though this is not
necessarily made explicit in the CDR, it can be intuited through the way he
approaches objective reality as social, which is to say, by the fact that he claims
that things are, in a sense, social facts.
Where Durkheim places emphasis on the objective character or thingliness
of social facts, Sartre takes a more balanced approach: both things and social facts
occupy the same reality insofar as one's experience of each can be mediated by
the other, insofar as the existence of both is internalized into a certain framework
in the mind, and insofar as both things and social facts occupy a space outside of
any particular agent or consciousness. The univocity of the being of the social
fact and the thing in Sartre justifies his use of the dialectic insofar as it allows for
the interaction of these two supposedly discrete spheres, which means that it also
allows for—though it does not necessitate —the co-determination mentioned
above, which Sartre will call "dialectical circularity" (Sartre 2004: 79).
The question now becomes whether this reciprocity between social facts
and things exists, rather than how it functions. Durkheim's point in writing that
social facts should be treated as things was not to establish some ontological or
epistemic equivalence between discrete categories. Rather, though his point was
somewhat more involved than this, it resulted in the notion that social facts
should be treated as things in a pragmatic sense if sociology was to become
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objective and scientific —it was thus a matter of stating the optimal methodology.
Sartre's case is somewhat more difficult to justify, since it seems that he is, in fact,
attempting to set up an equivalence or reciprocity between the social fact and the
thing. Above, social facts and things are compared on three criteria: how they
mediate each other, how they are experienced by subjects or agents, and how
they are both external to particular agents.
On the question of mediation, one's relation to social facts is mediated by
things insofar as they are absent or present as well as by their particular
character. In the same way, one's relation to things can be mediated by social
facts. For example, a spider or cockroach might not appear edible until one is
forced to ration edible materials due to a war; or it might not be as desirable to
possess land rich in a particular ore until technology has developed enough for
its extraction. Whether one experiences the lack of an object as a need is often
largely dependent on social forces and facts, in other words. Peer pressure a
decade ago made the toy Furby a necessity for anyone with a young child, even
though today, millions of children exist lacking this toy, but it is not felt as a
necessity, if it is even felt at all. In this way, one's relation to matter is mediated
by social facts, evincing a reciprocity between the two.
That things are external to any particular agent shall only be a contentious
claim to solipsists or idealist philosophers, either of which groups suffer from an
uncommon atavism. Whether social facts are external to particular agents or
subjects is a somewhat less clear cut question. Certainly, the fact that such facts

are termed 'social' would indicate that they exist as relations between social
agents or subjects, in an intermonde. Yet there are those who would argue5 that
social facts exist in the minds of particular agents or subjects, and exist
simultaneously in the minds of others, perhaps in a slightly or drastically
different form—the divergence of one's notion of social facts from another's
leading to problems in social structures, such as battles for power where each
party believes the group dynamics should favour them over the other. This type
of argument would be convincing, were it not missing the point almost entirely.
The argument misses the point because if social facts exist outside of the mind of
any particular agent, they would be able to be misapprehended and
misunderstood. The fact that something is objective or thingly does not mean
that all well agree when attempting to determine or ascertain its character.
Consider objects once more, for instance; if one misrecognizes a crocodile as a
dead tree floating in the water, this does not mean that the object is in one's
mind, only that one has failed to adequately identify it. The same holds for social
facts.
Thus, Sartre's contention that social facts are things only in so far as things
as social facts is borne out through the kind of reciprocity between social facts
and things alluded to above. This allows Sartre to claim that there can be a
materialist dialectic at work even when the object of the dialectic in question is
something as prima facie immaterial as thought or social facts. Thus, the value of
5 Cf. Hund, John. "Are Social Facts Real?" British Journal of Sociology Vol. 33 No. 2 June 1982. p. 270ff.

retaining the dialectic can be seen as the establishment of a critical social
mereology —a dialectically inflected version of the relation of parts and wholes.
The relation of parts to the whole of society is complicated —but usefully so, as
will be shown below—by the establishment of the dialectic. Where analytic
reason is often content to consider society as an additive totality, where the
relations of part to whole is one of additive constitution —the whole is the sum of
its parts —dialectical reason is the foundation of a superadditive notion of
society, one where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. This
superadditivity is conditioned by the fact that the individual is not considered as
a liberal monad, discrete from all other individuals, but as something of a nexus
of social relations, where the addition of more individuals to its community
elicits changes in its internal relations as well as its external relations. This notion
of individuality is operative in Sartre's discussion of group formation, though its
occlusion is the basis of seriality, as will be demonstrated in our discussion of
group formation, below.
There are certain elements of the dialectic that are either scoffed at as
atavistic or unscientific, or simply difficult to reformulate in a materialist
framework. Sartre is cognisant of this, but nonetheless finds a way to include at
least one of the elements that is both difficult to think of in a materialist
framework, and necessary for any notion of dialectics, namely, the famous notion
of the negation of the negation.
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Where do we find the negation of the negation as affirmation in the
material or social world? Before Sartre can answer this question, it is useful for
him to explain exactly what is meant by negation. In elaborating the principle of
the negation of the negation as affirmation, Engels was unable to see it as
anything more than an abstraction from the laws of nature as they are considered
analytically. This is not the orientation that Sartre has towards this admittedly
disputed law of dialectics.
Sartre is entirely willing to dismiss the notion of negation as objective. He
is not of the opinion, for example, that electrical resistance is a negation of the
free movement of electrical currents, nor that the inclusion of a perfect conductor
would be a negation of this negation. Sartre writes that "to declare that two
opposed forces applied to a membrane negate each other is as absurd as saying
that they collaborate to determine a certain tension" (Sartre 2004: 84, emphasis
original). At the same time, though, Sartre is willing to admit negation as an
operative category, when the determination identifies something within a totalization
or a totality (cf. CDR 85). Thus, in any milieu where human praxis is operative,
since praxis totalises, determination may be a negation, but only within that
totalization, that is to say, only within the field of human praxis, and not, say,
from the perspective of the view from nowhere.
Given this, Sartre can find a place for the negation of the negation as
affirmation, at least insofar as scarcity exists as a negation, and the human
attempts to overcome scarcity can be viewed within the totalization of human
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praxis as the affirmative negation of that negation. Scarcity is one of the most
fundamental and important concepts of the CDR, while also being consistent
with some of Sartre's earlier work. Scarcity fulfills the drive that Sartre had to
discredit naturalistic interpretations of human behaviour in a far less abstract
way than the earlier dictum that "existence precedes essence"6 and in a way that
is consistent with the material world and lived experience.
In the CDR, scarcity can be summarized as the fact that "there is not enough
for everybody" (Sartre 2004:128, emphasis original). If inorganic material in the
form of inert matter is that which practical and purposive actions of human
beings must pass through in order to achieve their ends, then the lack of
sufficient material for the completion of these ends is a negation in the sense
mentioned above, that is, within the totalization given by practical activity. This
also means that the transcendence of these material conditions by praxis is a
negation of the lack-felt-as-need imposed by scarcity within the totalization
given by human praxis as project. In short, the process of overcoming scarcity in
the practical field to the extent necessary to achieve certain determinate practical
ends is an affirmation coming out of the negation of a negation.

6 Cf. Fredric Jameson's Foreword to the CDR, p. xviii: "Indeed the simple fact of inhabiting a world of
scarcity [...] explains the fact of aggressivity and violence in a situational rather than a naturalistic way."
Though what Jameson seems to overlook is that, paired with the notion of the practico-inert that will be
discussed later, the notion of scarcity includes the insights of certain naturalistic explanations of human
behaviour, without, by dint of this, re-inscribing human behaviour into something like human nature. All
of the insights of socio-biology and evolutionary biology such as Darwinian selection, which are generally
understood as falling into the "nature" side of the nature-nurture debate, can be understood situationally
and historically using the tools that Sartre gives us in the CDR as little more than the long-term effect of
structures of individual praxis mediated over generations by the practico-inert and emerging out of a
milieu of scarcity.
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Not only does it instantiate one of the so-called "laws of the dialectic/'7
but scarcity effectively becomes the engine of our, that is to say human, history,
what Sartre calls the "passive motor" of history (Sartre 2004:122). This statement
must be understood in two senses. The first sense, which I believe is made
completely explicit in the CDR, is that, when human activity is such as to negate
the constraints on freedom imposed on humans by materials, human activity is
transformed, in its negation of scarcity, into praxis, that is, into purposive action
with certain ends, what Sartre calls the project in Being and Nothingness. Praxis,
understood as the negation of scarcity, can be historicized, put into narratives,
and understood, as it already has, a unifying principle—praxis is totalization.
The second sense in which scarcity can be said to act as the engine of
history is in a deeper, ontological sense, where time and space are themselves
scarce, forcing human activity into a framework of finitude and giving human
existence the directionality of being-towards-death. For this to be an operative
mode of scarcity on more than a metaphorical level, one would need to see time
and space not as the Kantian forms of inner and outer sense, but as something
like resources. This second sense is not only made explicit in passing in the CDR
and may be too abstract for our purposes here. The scarcity of time manifests
itself as a "temporalisation as urgency" (Sartre 2004: 739, emphasis original). This
form of scarcity complements the first form, transforming abstract needs into

7 Sartre has many grounds on which to be critical of Engels' laws of reason as applied to the natural world,
cf. CDR 32 where Sartre criticizes Engels for positing as a fact the existence of dialectical laws in nature
after only having discovered their existence in the social world.
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things that are necessary now, rather than later, giving the motive force to
history.
Sartre rightly points out that scarcity in the first sense is a contingent but
ubiquitous fact of human existence, that it is "indeed logically possible to
conceive of other organisms on other planets having a relation to their
environment other than scarcity" (Sartre 2004:123). The fact of the matter is that
even though the existence and operation of scarcity is a contingent fact of our
history, and someday it might even be overcome, it has held sway over the
course of human existence thus far, and shaped the ways in which human beings
have interacted with each other and with their environment. Sartre sees the
ubiquity of scarcity as that which conditions human history and makes it
particular: "so today everyone must recognise this basic contingency as the
necessity which, working both through thousands of years and also, quite
directly, through the present, forces him to be exactly what he is" (Sartre 2004:
124).
The rubric of scarcity, and thus the notion of dialectical reason of which
scarcity is but a part, is not simply another meaning-making system, a heuristic
or hermeneutic device to ease man's troubled mind. The necessity of this rubric
to explain history, techniques, and institutions does not come out of the fact that
either scarcity or the dialectic is a "real force" which has "produced" specific
techniques, institutions, or history itself, but out of the fact that these last were
themselves "produced in the milieu o f scarcity by men whose praxis interiorises
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this scarcity even when they try to transcend it" (Sartre 2004:127, emphasis
original).
The shared or reciprocal nature of the world emerges as a result of
scarcity, insofar as within the milieu of scarcity the actions of others take on
meaning as a constraint on one's own possibilities for action. In a banal sense,
person A eating an apple can always be interpreted as depriving person B of an
apple; since "there is not enough for everyone," there is always the possibility of
the other's consumption being experienced by one as a threat. In this way, there
is always the abstract possibility that man can see others as little more than their
capacity to consume, and thus come to "find each of them to be the material
possibility of his being annihilated through the material annihilation of an object
of primary necessity" through their consumption of that object (Sartre 2004:128).
Scarcity is thus a negative unity of the practical field insofar as it
characterizes each human being as both victim and cause of scarcity for others.
Thus, scarcity is a negative unity only when interiorized as that which parcels
out the practical field. Praxis, however, as stated above, is the negation of
scarcity insofar as one's projects must deal with material scarcity as an internal
limit to action. Given that praxis is both mediated by inert matter and introduced
into the world as work upon inertia, one must question how the interaction of
praxis and inertia functions in the world.
The domain of equivalence between alienated praxis and worked inertia is
what Sartre calls the practico-inert. Essentially, the past action of any agent is
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constructed as a thing or as inert; in fact, this is not much of a construction, since
praxis, once put into the world, inheres in things as well as in the habits of
people. The thingliness of past praxis allows praxis to be worked over, to be the
object of new praxis. However, the practico-inert passively resists one's
purposive actions, such that praxis, once alienated from its author, can be turned
against that author's intended ends, in what Sartre calls counter-finalities.
Praxis acts on the world, but the matter in which past praxis inheres can act
as the negation of praxis, subverting the aims of praxis and becoming, in effect,
anti-praxis. This is what Sartre calls the anti-dialectic of the practico-inert: "what
we call the dialectic of passivity, or anti-dialectic, is the moment of intelligibility
corresponding to a praxis turned against itself in so far as it is reinstated as the
permanent seal of the inert" (Sartre 2004: 66-7n.28). The practico-inert thus takes
the form of an anti- or inverted dialectic since it is precisely what the dialectic of
praxis must seek to overcome, and what initially acts as its negation. That is to
say, in working upon the world to achieve some specific end, one must negate at
least some aspect of the current state of affairs in order to transcend it and create
a new state of affairs. Almost immediately, though, the alienation of praxis
necessary to work upon the world works its magic, and the new state of affairs
becomes yet another level of inertia that can be worked over.
Human beings are not, however, totally isolated by the practico-inert field.
In fact, even though every individual experiences in his praxis an antagonistic
relationship to others in the competition for scarce material, insofar as each

51

individual attempts a unification of the shared practical field of inert matter, the
praxes of individuals jointly constitute the field of the practico-inert as a shared
field of activity, and individuals may thus cooperate in their practical
endeavours. The absolute separation of individuals is a form of human relations
imposed on individuals from the outside, a form of social relations which
individuals "institute [...] among themselves (on the basis of relations established
by earlier generations, of their own constitution, and of the forces and
requirements of the time)" (Sartre 2004: 97, emphasis original). All of this is to
say that any form of social relations among humans, because it is not natural but
created by humans and instituted by them, owes its continued existence to the
action or inaction required to uphold it.
Group Formation and Sociality
History, as a totalization, cannot remain at the level of the individual, and
the CDR must show how individuals embody this totalization, but also how
individuals are linked by bonds of inferiority which create the "dialectical
intelligibility of these reversible processes" of group formation and dissolution
(Sartre 2004: 65). The analysis of group formation and dissolution will do more
than merely establish how social relations between humans are formed,
sustained, and modified, but it will also go a long way to establishing the
constitutive dialectic of individual praxis, the anti-dialectic of the practico-inert,
and the constituted dialectic of group praxis. Thus, within the internal logic of
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the CDR, the aim of which is to determine the field of validity of the dialectic,
Sartre happens to come upon a theory of sociality and politics.
The "most obvious, immediate and superficial gatherings of the practical
field" are what Sartre will call series or collectives (Sartre 2004: 252). As we have
seen in our discussion of scarcity, in the domain of the dialectic of individual
praxis, one nonetheless "still exists and acts in the presence of everyone else,"
such that other members of the society "exist for him collectively, in that each of
them is a threat to his life" (Sartre 2004:128). Within the series, there is a serial
unity, where no particular member is necessary. The famous example of the
series is the queue for the bus at the Place Saint-Germain. With scarcity as the
fundamental relationship between these people waiting for the bus and their
environment, we come to find that there are not enough places on the bus for
everyone, and at this moment, one sees that this scarcity, "in the absence of any
particular practice, would designate every individual as dispensable" because
with the series of people waiting for the bus, each individual is identical in terms
o f their goal o f getting on the bus8, which is the constitutive element of their
existence as serial multiplicity (Sartre 2004: 260).

8 It is worth mentioning, although the structure of the text does not make for an easy or obvious location
for this aside, that the level of isolation that appears to be operative in the series is illusory. Even within
the structure of seriality, the individuals involved are not isolated monads. The relations at work in the
serial collective are in fact permeated by reciprocity and bonds of interiority, in the manner explained by
Sartre in the section of the CDR subtitled, in the Alan Sheridan-Smith translation, Duality and the Third
Party. In this section, Sartre shows that ternary relations are the most basic form of social relation, out of
which the analyses of larger ensembles will grow. Without digressing too long into his examples, I will
simply say that Sartre shows that through the operation of a third party, any two other parties become
what they are, to the extent that the third party becomes what he is through them. By depriving the
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From this example, it might be difficult to imagine how common praxis
could emerge, which is to say how groups can exist in the superadditive sense
necessitated by the dialectic, especially in a meaningful way such as to create
something new, and not merely recapitulate extant forms of social relations in
the mode of the constant repetition of practico-inert structures which have their
existence through the habits of each member of a serial ensemble collectively.
This difficulty would be insurmountable were it not the case that scarcity in the
practical field —that is, scarcity when it has something to do with the praxis and
the ends of an individual —can be felt as need, and need can trigger structural
change in the form of cooperation or antagonism.
If need structures the serial collective such that it inculcates antagonism,
then each member of the series sees the others as his enemy, as the anti-human,
and a greater or lesser level of hostility results. Sartre sees this clearly, and this
motion can be explained by means of appeal to rational self-interest. Sartre here
concerns himself instead with those moments of solidarity, where rational selfinterest does not manifest itself as antagonism. Sartre poses the question, which
leads to his discussion of group formation, as this: "Why is it that, as sometimes
happens, individuals in a given case do not quarrel over food like dogs?" (Sartre
2004: 350). He comes to the hypothesis that it is perhaps the feeling that it is
impossible to live if seriality continues that necessitate the move to group praxis.

other of an objective aspect of the world, each constitutes the limit of the other by constituting the
objective limit of the other's knowledge and power (Cf. CDR 101-103).
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If need makes the continuation of serial collectivity impossible through, for
example, the threat of death, then groups emerge, constituted "as the radical
impossibility of living" as a serial multiplicity (Sartre 2004: 341). The inert
gathering, when threatened, can form a group, capable of active praxis, in which
the praxis of each member sustains the praxis of the group.
Sartre clarifies the mechanics of the formation of groups out of serial
multiplicities in his discussion of the storming of the Bastille. The looting of the
arsenals of Paris in 1789 took place as "serial, defensive violence" and not as an
organized, common action, though this latter would be its historical significance
(Sartre 2004: 354); despite being undertaken by many members of the
multiplicity, the citizens were not yet a group, as Sartre will later define it. Only
when the collective, independent praxis of the people of Paris took the form of
the determination that" the people o f Paris had armed themselves against the King"
does the group recognize itself as being something other than dispersed
collective (serial) action (Sartre 2004: 355, emphasis original). The collective
action of what would be the group-in-fusion, the action of raiding the armouries
in an attempt to secure the means of self-defence, articulated not only the
freedom of the individual against the army and the state which were bearing
down on the individuals, but also appears, constituted from the outside on the
basis of the political praxis of the government, as the unity of group action, rather
than the passive activity of a serial multiplicity. As of yet, though, the unity of
this group "is elsewhere" (Sartre 2004:355). The unity of the group is both past
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and future at this point; the group "had performed an action", and its members
recognize their serial actions, "with surprise as a moment" of group activity
already passed, and it was future insofar as the weapons gained from the
armouries "suggested in their very materiality the possibility of concerted
resistance" (Sartre 2004: 355).
Thus, in the first instance, groups can only form as a synthetic
determination: it is only through the "synthetic relations amongst other groups"
that a group can come about through seriality (Sartre 2004: 363). This is a
necessary condition, but not sufficient, in that, despite this determination from
the outside, the serial collectivity must nonetheless realise this extraneous
determination through self-determination (Sartre 2004: 362). The serial
multiplicity, in the case of the storming of the Bastille, totalises itself as a group
(and this is meant in a very material sense: the totalization is both an ideal act on
the part of any individual from within the serial structure and the realisation of
group action in terms of sustained praxis) on the basis of another group (in this
case, the government, represented by the antagonistic presence of the dragoons),
whose praxis aims at the negation of the serial multiplicity in question. We
witness here the occasion of a group forming as the negation of a negation:
government praxis aims at the destruction of a serial multiplicity considered as a
threat, and the serial multiplicity realises its ideal unity by negating that
governmental praxis and acting as a group. This fleeting form of the group is
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called the fused group, or the group-in-fusion9, where the praxis of the members
continually re-establishes the existence of the group, since there is no practicoinert scaffolding to hold the group up as an entity outside of the continued praxis
of the group's membership.
After the constitution of the group as such, it is impossible to feel the reemergence of seriality as anything other than a threat. At the moment of group
fusion, the individual identifies with the group, despite social heterogeneities,
because of the identity of their interests: the threat of death is enough to make
small-scale difference cease to matter. But the threat of death, which rouses
serial multiplicities into concrete and active unitary group praxis, is untenable at
the magnitude at which it is needed to secure the continued constitution of a
group on a practical level. Within the fused group, the ternary relations
mentioned above take on a different level of meaning than they do within the
serial multiplicity. In fact, within the fused group, common danger "tears
everyone away from his Other-Being in so far as he is a third party in relation to a
certain constellation of reciprocities; in short, it frees the ternary relation as a free
inter-individual reality, as an immediate human relation" (Sartre 2004: 367).
Each third party is thus the nexus wherein all of the various ends of the group
members are synthesized into a determinate objective of the group. Thus, "the

9 The term used by Sartre is "groupe en fusion" which has been translated both as "fused group" and
"group-in-fusion". In the following text, I will use the two interchangeably, though with some difference
in meaning: fused group will be the term of choice if I intend to refer to the group as an imaginary
totality—the group acting as such—while group-in-fusion will be the term I use when I wish to stress the
group as a process of totalization, that is, as the praxis of generating and sustaining the group.
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objective of the third party produces itself for him as a common objective, and the
plurality of epicentres reveals itself for him as a common exigency" (Sartre 2004:
367).
The distinction between totality and totalization becomes operative here.
Totalities are superadditive, that is to say, they are more than the sum of their
parts, and the whole is present in some form in each of its parts. This
superadditivity comes about either through an ideal act —where the totality is an
imaginary totality —or as a real ontological totality, which would constitute the
totality as nothing if not the en-soi, the inert, bare materiality. This materiality is
the ontological status to which imaginary totalities lay claim, if only through
synthetic activity on the part of a subject or through the past praxis of an
individual or group (Sartre 2004: 45). Totalization, on the other hand, is a
developing process towards a totality, with totality as its regulative principle
(Sartre 2004: 46). Without the sustained praxis of totalization, there can be no
totalization—it degenerates into inert molecularity. Totalization is the "rigorous
synthesis of the most differentiated multiplicity" (Sartre 2004: 46).
One sees this in human terms within the dialectic of group praxis and
group formation, where an inert imaginary totality, the serial multiplicity,
totalizes itself as a group-in-fusion, whereby the members of the serial
multiplicity recognize their reciprocal relations with others, their bonds of
inferiority, and cease to see others as Others. Social heterogeneities dissolve
through the process of an active synthesis, and alterity dissolves into the
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structure of the group as commonality. The problem, as it occurs in the dialectic
of group praxis, is that without the activity of creating a synthetic unity, without
the "synthetic labour which makes each part an expression of the whole," the
group-in-fusion as totalization risks deteriorating into inert seriality (Sartre 2004:
46).
In practice, however, at least certain groups seem to be able to persist in
time quite easily and without the arduous and continuous labour of synthetic
unification, which is to say, without continually totalizing and re-totalizing.
Sartre introduces the idea of the pledge to obviate this difficulty. The pledge
introduces certain objective, external, and coercive measures in order to ensure
that the group coheres over time. The pledge is the practical device by which the
immediate form of the group-in-fusion, which is always in danger of dissolution,
becomes permanent, if reflexive, and thus mediated by the regulative praxis of an
imaginary totality (Sartre 2004: 420). The pledge means that "every member's
common membership of the group" will be inert, unchangeable, thingly, and
undialectical, even if the group itself is involved in "new dialectical combinations
which will transform it as such" (Sartre 2004: 420). The pledge constitutes an
agreement, "an objective guarantee from the other third party that he will never
become Other" (Sartre 2004:421). This pledge being common, it creates
community based in common bonds of inferiority, a modification of the group by
means of the third parties' regulatory actions (Sartre 2004: 422). Violation of the
pledge in a group formed by the threat of violence means death: "the group has
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to guarantee everyone's freedom against necessity, even at the cost of his life and
in the name of freely sworn faith," which is to identify the pledge with its
correlate, namely that "you must kill me if I secede" (Sartre 2004: 431).
The pledge, at the level of groups formed by the threat of death, recreates
that threat insofar as it is necessary for the cohesion of the group in the face of the
dissipation of the initial threat. The pledge thus institutes terror in the name of
fraternity. But not all groups are formed on the basis of the threat of death; any
form of need born of scarcity is sufficient for the fusion of a group. The violence
Sartre mentions is only inscribed in the fusion of a group —and thus must only be
recreated for the cohesion of the group —in the specific cases where the fusion of
the group is born out of the struggle for survival. The disciplinary violence of
the pledge only takes on its terroristic form when that terroristic form is adequate
to the conditions in which the group was created. Sartre's example of the groupin-fusion at the storming of the Bastille is merely an example based on one of the
most prominent instances of group formation in his nation's history.
Sartre's analysis does not end with the pledged group, however. To end
the analysis there would be inadequate indeed, since as of yet, his analysis
provides no means of understanding the specificity of groups. To do this, at least
one more step is required, namely, a notion of the division of labour. For Sartre,
the group-in-fusion operates on a level where reciprocity is such that there is no
division of labour, and any member may be called on for any task. The praxis of
the fused group is, for all intents and purposes, " non-differentiated" (Sartre 2004:
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445). The distribution of tasks is a characteristic of most groups, where the
specializations of its members are a necessary component of the structure and
organization of the group.
Once tasks begin to be differentially distributed among the members of an
organization, the individual praxis of a member of the group is no longer
intelligible as such outside of the context of the group; it can only be
comprehended as the praxis constitutive of the group. The meaning of one's
individual praxis outside of its partial ends becomes unintelligible when taken
apart from the actions "of the other members of his team" (Sartre 2004: 457). The
differentiation of tasks and the hardening of social roles based on a concretized
heterogeneity involved in the structure of the organization tend towards the
optimization of the field of possibilities for the group. In the pledged group, the
only possibility, the only instrumentality of the group was the cohesion and
persistence of the group in the face of an external threat, whereas the distribution
of tasks and introduction of social heterogeneity allow the individual's free praxis
to be improved on and absorbed by the group, "beyond the task and the pledge"
(Sartre 2004:463).
The heterogeneities already present within the organization become
emphasized within what Sartre calls the institution. Institutions come about with
the sedimentation and bureaucratisation of the organizational structure of the
group, and at this stage, the individual becomes differentiated enough to no
longer carry more than a trace of the solidarity present in, for example, the
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group-in-fusion. The institutionalization of the organization is done as a reaction
to schisms that arise in the organization, and the "common individual"
transforms himself though his own praxis and the institution of a sovereign into
an "institutionalized individual" (Sartre 2004: 591). This movement, Sartre notes,
appears to be an instance of dialectical circularity insofar as the institution
appears to reinstate the practico-inert structure of sociality that was present in
the serial multiplicity, and which Freedom-Terror had removed itself from
earlier, in the movement towards the fusion of the group (Sartre 2004: 591).
Concluding Comments: Dialectical Circularity and Sartre's Optimism
With the institution enforcing seriality, we arrive at a more structured
version of where we began, and Sartre's discussion of social groups, far from
giving us a working image of political and social solidarity, seems to resolve
itself to a pessimistic world-view. Thus, at the end of his discussion of social
formations, which can be and has been seen as a coded description of the genesis
and development of the Soviet Union, Sartre claims that, in an act of fidelity to
the initial conditions of its inception, the sovereign, in this case, Stalin "must
gradually abandon [his] monopoly o f the group" (Sartre 2004: 661). What began as
a dialectical and structural account of the workings of individual praxis in a
milieu of scarcity abuts in a plea to the goodwill of the Communist Party.
Albert Camus, expressing a certain amount of pessimism himself, gives in
L'Homme révolté a psychological explanation of why the institution of Soviet
Communism took the turn it did: "V esclave commence par réclamer justice et finit

par vouloir la royauté." (Camus 1951: 34). This is not a universal truth, but it
certainly fits the case of Soviet Communism which Sartre obviously had in mind.
It is not a universal truth if only because there is nothing universal about the
ends to which praxis aims. If praxis aims at demanding justice by making oneself
the judge, jury, and executioner, this praxis amounts to nothing more than
claiming that the world is an awful place, which I must rule. It is to claim for
oneself the position of the monsters against which one is putatively fighting.
This is where Sartre, forcibly, comes to end his discussion of social formations: at
the most monstrous form of social formation imaginable. That such monstrous
formations have been instituted in fact and might be again is something that
anyone studying social formations must contend with if the analysis is to be of
any practical use, and, more importantly, if it is to be correct.
If this seems like an end point which invalidates Sartre's theses, which
gives no hope for the future, which, in short, leads the reader to a feeling that
tyranny is everywhere and inescapable and that all acts of political and social
resistance will in their turn simply put in place another monster, perhaps worse
than the last, then one has failed to grasp the key point which Sartre attempts to
show. The dialectic, for Sartre, is neither mechanistic nor deterministic. The
necessities of which he speaks are material realities, contingent and changeable.
Scarcity is, for example, less palpable in North America today than it was in
Russia in 1917 or in Paris in 1789, not because of some structural quirk in the
dialectic, but because of free individual praxis. The circularity of the dialectic,

that it continually turns and returns upon itself, far from being a vicious
circularity is what allows for hope in this analysis. The institution is the
endpoint of the discussion only in terms of the fact that the institution develops
out of the organization, but it is neither the logical end of the development of
social formations, nor the chronological end of any social development. From
the inert seriality imposed in the institution, praxis can emerge which will form a
counter-group to the institution, dissolving its stranglehold on freedom. The
anteriority of the fused group to the institution does not make the institution the
telos of the fused group, it merely implies that the institution is founded on "as
determinations and negations" of the fused group, in the same way that groups
are logically constituted through determinations and negations of collectives
(Sartre 2004: 348). Sartre is thus merely showing how free praxis has constrained
itself through the formation of institutions out of more free groups, but, through
the discussion of the formation of fused groups, he has already provided the
theoretical key to the unravelling of institutional strictures. We will expand on
this more concretely in the following chapters.
Individual praxis, it must be stressed, is man's free reaction to the
vicissitudes of his situation. By making himself a tool of his own project, he
works on the practico-inert in order to achieve his ends and to inscribe his values
into the world. If the success or failure of the dialectic of individual praxis seems
over-determined by the anti-dialectic of the practico-inert and the dialectic of
group praxis, then the case has been overstated. While it is true that the practico-
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inert is such that it alienates praxis and can turn it contrary to its ends —that is to
say that it is productive of counter-finalities —it is by means of this very
alienation that praxis has any hope of success at all in a milieu of scarcity and
need. If, on the other hand, one sees individual praxis as being subsumed by
group praxis, one must remember that a large part of group praxis is not the praxis
of the group itself—the group acting on the world in organized or communal
action—but the praxis, at the level of individual praxeis, of sustaining the group,
continually re-instituting it, reaffirming its existence and value.
Sartre's placement of the individual, understood in a certain sense, at the
foundation of his dialectic, and his account of the genesis and possible
development of social and political groups, as well as his exposition of the
vicissitudes of scarcity and the practico-inert both as obstacles to and
preconditions of active praxis, enable him to provide the reader with a unique
and, I believe, eminently useful perspective from which to view historical and
contemporary social and political movements. The theory that Sartre expounds
provides us with a view of the political that is occluded or ignored in the
voluntarism and idealism of liberal political theory. Sartre's is a view of the
political based in the critical notions of scarcity, materiality, and sociality, all of
which are at best abstract categories in liberal views of politics. The utility of
Sartre's claims to the larger project we are engaged in comes out of these
emphasised aspects of his theory. In the following chapters, through a
discussion of Sartre's later ethical writings and of a critical notion of human

65

rights, we will develop the role that individual praxis must have in any ethical
political formation, and how social formations can be structures such as to
promote free praxis rather than constrain it.
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Chapter Three: Sartre's Later Ethics
“My optimism would consist in saying, ‘So many things can be changed, being as fragile as they are, tied
more to contingencies than to necessities, more to what is arbitrary than to what is rationally established,
more to complex but transitory historical contigencies than to inevitable anthropological constants...’ 10

Introduction: Ethics and the Practico-Inert
In his discussion of group formation, Sartre gives us some insights into the
mechanics behind sociality. In this chapter, we will combine those insights with
some of the insights that can be garnered from his later works on ethics in order
to explicate the validity and moral relevance of our claims about ethics and
politics. The argument of this chapter will involve placing the seemingly
disparate insights of the previous chapter within the parameters of the ethical
experience brought up by Sartre in the Cornell Lectures and Saint Genet. This
will point us in the direction of a different way of organizing the rights discourse,
divorced from state power structures which attempt to halt the development of
rights by enshrining them in law, at the expense of their future development.
As we saw in the preceding chapter, Sartre conserves a strong notion of
situational freedom, even as he relates to us how this freedom is conditioned
both by the material world and history—that is, by the practico-inert—and by the
structural transformations of social groups. At the level of the individual, this
freedom is the only morally relevant aspect of being: the goal of praxis is at heart

10 Michel Foucault, (2000) 'So is it important to think? '. In J. Faubion (ed.). Tr. Robert Hurley and others.
Power The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. Volume Three. New York: New Press, p. 458.
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to negate the constraints on situational freedom imposed on us by scarcity, the
practico-inert and other agents. Thus, any ethical or political system based on
the theory that Sartre gives us in the CDR will, of necessity, be aimed at the
maximization of practical freedom within a situation. As with Kant, this freedom
is circumscribed by two provisions: that the freedom of any agent cannot be
taken to be of more ethical or moral import than that of another agent and that
the freedom being referred to cannot ethically opt to unduly constrain itself.
From these provisions, we see that all agents have equal standing on the one
hand, and that one cannot subject one's will to that of another in order to absolve
oneself of the responsibilities inherent in being a free ethical subject. This latter
provision also holds for values or actions that would be undertaken simply as a
matter of subscribing to juridical or social authority, actions which are neither
autonomous nor autarchic.
That all agents have equal moral standing is demonstrated by the
ontological fact that there is no external determination of freedom, simply as a
matter of its definition: freedom is unconditioned. Freedom being the capacity to
act in a situation, however, one might act either to affirm or ignore one's
freedom, based on external, which is to say situational, factors. The threat of
violence might, for example, convince someone to obey an unethical law. Here,
freedom as a capacity for action is still operational, but the realization of that
freedom is constrained.
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The constraint of freedom through violence, the history of oppression in
other words, can be understood in terms of attempted negations of freedom,
which harm both the oppressed and the oppressor. An example of how
oppression of one group effects a stranglehold over even the oppressor can be
found in Sartre's description of colonialism and the colonial apparatus, wherein
the colonizer must make himself inhuman by dehumanizing the colonized,
creating "A relentless reciprocity [that] binds the colonizers to the colonized, his
product and his fate" (Sartre 1965: xviii). That the two are intertwined, one in
terms of the project of the other, is a matter of fact. The dehumanization of the
colonized, the fact that the colonial system seeks both the "death and the
multiplication of its victims," is a contradiction such that the colonizer, the
colonized, and with them the colonial apparatus cannot endure (Sartre 1965: xvii).
The multiplication of its victims, the colonized, the sub-proletariat, would lower
the cost of colonial labour to a point where the colonized would be unable to
maintain even their meagre existence; the death of its victims would be the
extermination not only of the colonized, but also of the colonizer and colonialism
itself (Sartre 1965: xvii). Thus, Sartre shows "the colonizer and his victim both
throttled by the colonial apparatus, that cumbersome machine" (Sartre 1965:
xviii). This is a machine, though, that is supported by the praxis of the coloniser
and the inaction, appearing as un-freedom, of the colonised. Being an oppressor,
one is forced to either continually reassert oppression or else to cease oppressing
and thereby lose any of the purported benefits of oppression. The violence of
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colonial oppression, perhaps matched by the violence sometimes necessary to
end it, results from the force required to suppress the realization of situational
freedom, both the freedom of the colonist and that of the colonized. In the
colonial system, oppression is normalized on both ends —the oppressor and the
oppressed see their relative position as something given from the outside—until
it becomes unliveable, and violence seeks to upset the colonial system.
Normativity
This normativity that sustains the colonial system for a time is, for Sartre,
a key component of the ethical domain, and, to the extent that politics and ethics
overlap, it is also a key component of the political (Stone and Bowman 1991: 5960). Norms are social and historical constructs, and thus belong, to a certain
extent, to the realm of the practico-inert. As we have seen, the practico-inert is a
condition, limit, and component of freedom within any situation. In his Cornell
Lectures, Sartre invites us to consider ethical norms as coming to us in a variety
of ways, most notably as either imperatives or values. Imperatives take place on
the juridical plane: they are enforceable and clear. An imperative says "do" or
"do not;" it is the external imposition of either a duty or a prohibition. Values,
on the other hand, are internal to the individual and express the style or manner
in which actions are undertaken. Values and imperatives are revealed, in Sartre's
phenomenology of ethical experience, as two sides of the same phenomenon:
" l'éthique des valeurs pose la liberté comme pouvoir et en fait l'aliène au lieu que
l'éthique de l'impératif soumet la liberté à l'interdit mais en fait la suscite" (Sartre 1964:
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487). We will come to show how this is the case below, as well as its import to
our discussion of the human rights discourse.
Values are the interiorization of norms, such that a person holds them as a
matter of their being. As such, values, as the internalized reflection of practicoinert norms, represent the diversion of free praxis by worked matter: "la valeur
originellement c'est le pouvoir humain canalisé dans une certain direction par un
matériau ouvré sur le fondement de la rareté et dans le milieu de l'échange" (Sartre 1964:
482). Of necessity, these norms will be the superstructural reflections of the
interests of the historically dominant class. The entire history of virtue ethics,
then, can be read as the transposition of practico-inert systems of moral
superstructures (cf. Verstraeten 1987: 61). As such, values-based ethical systems
act in disaccord with the notion of freedom, since values-based ethics will
explicitly or implicitly reveal themselves to be side-effects of social or political
pressure. The freedom experienced within a values-based understanding of
ethics is a freedom which is experienced as delimited by the practico-inert, such
that "l'avenir pur de la liberté historique est ici avenir indépassable et limité [...] la
liberté d'entreprise reflétée par un objet practico-inerte comme relation pratique à un
avenir indépassable quoiqu'indéterminé." (Sartre 1964: 481). "Value is alienating," as
Baiasu daims, insofar as values are socially determined and determined through
the practico-inert (Baiasu 2011:188). Values-based ethics represent the pressure
of external norms imposing themselves on the free agent as a constitutive limit to
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that agent's freedom, and, as such, must be jettisoned if freedom—and thus
reciprocity and ethics —are to survive.
In a tangential footnote to the CDR, Sartre remarks on the concept of
value, acknowledging that this falls outside of the topic he had set for himself in
the CDR. Value, he says, represents the "contradictory unity" of freedom and
necessity, "of praxis [...] and of exigency" (Sartre 2004: 247 n.75). Value, as the
untranscendable limit to action "towards which every action transcends the
material conditions which occasion it" becomes the becoming-inert of praxis itself
(Sartre 2004: 248 n.75). Values are thus beholden to the practico-inert structures
that occasion them, and thus if praxis in its unconditioned development is to be
"the sole ethical relation between people," value systems as the basis of ethics
will of necessity disappear (Sartre 2004: 249 n.75). In this way, we see that
values, being the monstrous and contradictory unity of freedom and necessity,
the internalization of the practico-inert field as the end of freedom, unduly
constrain freedom by falsely positing an imaginary positive totality as the
horizon which delimits the field of praxis.
Thus, the statement that Sartre makes in Saint Genet: Actor & Martyr is
borne out with more force in the CDR and the Cornell Lectures: "any Ethic which
does not explicitly profess that it is impossible today contributes to the alienation
and bamboozling of men" (Sartre 1963:186n., emphasis original). Ethics that do
not take into account the impossibility of ethical action as the world stands today
are, a fortiori, alienating and mystifying. Values-based ethics are especially

pernicious, coming as they do from an internalization of the practico-inert, and
they manifest themselves in abstract, Spinozistic ethics (Sartre 1963: 60). This is
to say that values-based ethics manifest themselves as changes in disposition
rather than attempts to change the world; ethics coming from interiorization
demand internal rather than external changes. Sartre exemplifies this
phenomenon in the case of racism where the oppressed have demanded
integration. Realizing at a certain point that society as it stands will reject them
forever, they attempt to transform "an actual situation (T'm excluded from the
group') into an ethical imperative ('Therefore, I must take the initiative in
withdrawing')" (Sartre 1963: 54-5). In attempting to change themselves rather
than the world, the oppressed merely effect a change in their disposition towards
their oppression. In an almost heroic move of complacency, they will themselves
to be what they are, changing nothing and sacrificing the possibility for change
in the here and now, on the basis of an empty hope that their oppressive society
will someday integrate them as equals. The possibility for their practical
freedom is given up in favour of an abstract freedom to be what they are, and all
ethically important distinctions are thus categorized as modes of being rather
than as modes of doing. The possibility of doing good is subsumed by and
confused with the impossible ability to be good.
We see in this analysis of values-based ethical theories the reason that,
when analysed through the lens of ethics, groups such as the pledged group,
organization, and institution are all unethical social formations, or, more
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precisely, why these social formations act as impediments to ethical action.
Though the ethical was outside of the purview of his description and analysis in
the CDR, Sartre was not blind to the ethical dimension of what he was writing, as
is borne out by his recuperation of the themes of the CDR into the ethical sphere
in the Cornell Lectures, as well as his long footnote on values in the CDR (Sartre
2004: 248ff n.75). It is not simply a matter of the fact that in each of these cases,
the practico-inert reasserts itself as a constituent of the field of possible actions in
a situation. Rather, the unethical moment of these social formations comes, in
the pledged group, from the fact that the pledge is a self-imposed restriction of
the members' freedom for the preservation of the group and at the cost of the
members' autonomy. This motion is exacerbated in the organization, where the
reciprocity that existed between members at the level of the fused group, and
even, to a certain extent, at the level of the pledged group, is lessened by the
change in the relationship between part and whole —between the members of a
group and the group itself. At the level of the institution, especially when the
institution coheres around a sovereign, both reciprocity and freedom are wholly
subsumed for the sake of structural and strategic gains. The ensemble of agents
that once constituted a group becomes a serial multiplicity once more, which is to
say that it is once more immersed in the practico-inert not as that which must be
n ega ted by the active praxis o f a g ro u p b u t as the in ert lim it to their freedom .
This vicious circularity was referred to in the last chap ter outside o f its ethical
im port, m aking the dism alportrait o f this circularity that Sartre paints in the
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CDR even more sinister in its character. There would seem to be little hope for a
political program to be born from this rather pessimistic assessment of social and
political formation.
Be that as it may, there is still some modicum of hope in this grim portrait.
As we have seen in the analysis of the emergence of the group-in-fusion in the
last chapter, there can emerge from the ruins of history and the practico-inert
some ephemeral opportunity for progress. Though the anti-dialectic of the
practico-inert will divert active, organic praxis towards counter-finalities—ends
not intended by the agent—in reacting against the practico-inert, in attempting to
negate it through praxis (an attempt that fails to purely negate the practico-inert
because praxis is constituted by and constitutive of the practico-inert), often the
aims of praxis, the project of the agent, will nonetheless partially succeed. These
partial successes are not Sartre's mealy-mouthed concession to an audience that
would move from accusing him of pure voluntarism to accusing him of
determinism, but a structural element of the way scarcity and the practico-inert
affect praxis that can be experienced in everyday life.
As an example, one could think of a traveller to the New World in the 17th
century, attempting to construct a shelter for himself. The ends of his praxis are
clear: he wishes to build a cabin that would allow him to survive the winter. The
absence of proper tools and his lack of technical expertise in the realm of
construction are the manifestations of scarcity and the practico-inert,
respectively. Given these impediments to the goal of his praxis, it is not
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inconceivable that the traveller might fail in his attempt to build a cabin, and die
in the winter for the lack of shelter. It is at least equally likely, however, that his
attempts to build a cabin, though failed, partially succeed, and result in the
construction of, say, a shack in which he can build a fire, and sustain himself.
The diversion of praxis by the practico-inert, the failure of praxis in other words,
does not entail as a matter of logical implication that no progress is made. The
impediments to praxis merely represent the fact that the practico-inert effects a
certain coefficient of resistance to one's actions, and that they are thus necessarily
unsuccessful to the extent that this resistance has any effect.
For this reason, as it happens, Sartre would reject any traditional
consequentialist ethical system, based as they are on the assumption that one can
predict the way that our actions will affect the world. Because of both the
structure of consciousness and the workings of the practico-inert, praxis has by its
very definition, "ignorance and error as basic structures" (Sartre 2004: 811). Since
consequentialism is based on some notion of being able to predict outcomes,
ignorance and error as basic structures of praxis problematize consequentialist
ethics to an extent where they are not a viable philosophical or ethical disposition
towards the world.
Instead of basing ethics in values, outcomes or interests, which are
embroiled in the same problems as consequentialist ethics, Sartre's ethics will be
based in imperatives as an expression of norms. It may at first appear that an
ethical stance based in imperatives would be a dead end, insofar as imperatives
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are by definition external impositions of societal norms and thus open to the
same critiques as values with regard to their ostensible complicity with the
interests of the ruling class and their restrictions of freedom. The following
analysis will substantively differentiate values and imperatives not in terms of
their relative ethical validity, but in terms of the disposition of the ethical subject
towards the norm expressed by the value or imperative. This will dispel the
misapprehension that imperatives are open to the same criticisms as norms as
well as show that the imperative, while not necessarily inciting ethical
subjectivity, can nevertheless give rise to ethics by means of confronting a subject
with the reality of its own freedom.
Imperatives and Values
Imperatives have an inherent and inherently masked link to material
reality. They present themselves as unconditioned, in the sense that the order to
vote is self-grounding, axiomatic and irreducible to any state of affairs
whatsoever, yet the imperative "vote" carries with it the implied reference to an
entire series of material circumstances in expressing the duty it expresses: it is
unconditional "que dans les strides conditions où le vote, en l'occurence, est la défense
de privilèges défaits; le fait ici se cache derrière l'impératif' (Simont 1987: 37).
Imperatives hide the facts that make them imperative, phrasing what might only
be a hypothetical necessity as categorical. In the same way, Simont argues in her
summary and analysis of the Cornell Lectures that material reality reveals
structural imperatives. The factical existence of a tool, its shape, size, and
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proximity to an agent might present itself as an unequivocal interdiction —the
tool is too heavy, or cumbersome, or far, which is experienced as an interdiction.
Facts are thus not the basis of imperatives, nor are imperatives the basis of facts,
but each of the two terms is irreducible to the other. Imperatives, whether
expressing a duty or a prohibition, are negative. The structural vacuousness of
imperatives, that is, their nature as unconditional, cannot be reduced to the bare
and positive existence of brute fact, nor can the brute presence of facts be
reduced to the vacuousness of the imperative (Simont 1987: 37).
There is no doubt that imperatives are thus complicit with the practicoinert insofar as material reality is at the same time both material and social —
recall the co-determination of social facts and things referred to in Chapter Two.
The way in which a subject approaches the imperative as opposed to the way in
which it might be called on to act on a value is the key difference. Imperatives
are recognizable and recognized as external to a subject. Only the legislators
who created the law would think it accurate to claim that the imperative "do not
smoke" came from them. Everyone else encountering a no smoking sign
recognizes it as external. By dint of the imperative being external to the agent,
there is a choice to be made when confronting the imperative. One can either
obey the imperative or not: " L'impératif, en tant que volonté transmise par la
médiation de la matière ouvrée s'adresse directement à la liberté: son inertie et la liberté
concourent à produire la structure d'inconditionel" (Sartre 1964: 483).
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We will briefly contrast the nature of imperatives to that of values, as
another means of orienting oneself to the ethical. While one is not beholden to
values in such a way that would make it impossible to act against them, the fact
that values are internalized norms and thus appear to be coming from one's own
"moral compass" as it were makes it difficult to justify actions that are in discord
with values, if values form the basis of one's ethical calculations.
Values share a certain level of structural homology with imperatives, the
difference being that the first refers to mores —to the actions that were seen as
correct in the past and have been given to us as examples, telling us to "be
sincere", for example, because sincerity has been ethical, all of which is to say that
values refer to something like moral habit, the internalization of practico-inert
moral superstructures—whereas imperatives refer to external, institutional
fiats—the phrase "Thou shall not..." implies that the speaker is someone other
than the audience, which constitutes the main structural difference between
values and imperatives.
The ethical opportunity that arises from the choice posed by imperatives is
that they immediately plunge the ethical or political agent into a situation where
a choice must be made. Certainly, when confronted with an imperative, the
agent can act in accordance with the practico-inert moral superstructure. The
ethically relevant characteristic of the imperative comes from the fact that, when
confronted by an imperative the agent is not duped into believing that it comes
from within himself. This is enough to provide the possibility for an ethical
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decision, making individual actions, once more, decisive. This contrasts with
how an agent orients itself towards values, which are, again, nothing more than
the internalization of an external exigency, and thus are not in accordance with
freedom. Thus, in a concrete sense imperatives provide a chance to either affirm
or negate one's freedom in the ethical domain.
Imperatives are also the motive force of politics, insofar as they reveal the
truth of morality as an internalization of property rights, customs, social and
political practices passed down over the generations, in short, of the practicoinert, and allow the agent to aim its praxis at the negation of these morals, which
may be unethical. Here, a distinction must be made between morality and ethics.
Recalling Hegel's triadic relationship between right, morality, and ethics, Sartre
defines the first stage of ethics as "praxis explaining itself in terms of its
circumstances" (Sartre 2004:132). This is reminiscent of Hegel's ethics, in which
Sittlichkeit is the concrete content of the Moralität of Kant. Morality, as it pertains
to the self-imposed laws of the autonomous, autarchic subject, is devoid of
concrete content—it refers to abstract duties and a non-existent city of ends.
Ethics, on the other hand, coming out of the way the world is, "the concrete
morality of the new world" (Harris 1997: 20). Kant's morality thinks it
"intrinsically good" to "attack 'the way of the world'" because Kantian morality
aims towards the unreal and abstract essence of the world outside of the world
(Hegel 1977: 233). The ethical, for Sartre, always takes place within a determinate
situation, and thus neatly avoids the impracticability of Kantian Moralität.
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The Moment of Ethics and its Possibility
For Sartre ethics is immediately embedded in the situation of the agent.
Ethics begins with the material and intersubjective social reality that Kant's
morality evacuates of relevance through abstraction. The ethical begins with
"praxis explaining itself in terms of its circumstances" as we have seen. The
second moment of ethics is the recognition of the other as le contre-homme because
of his similarity to oneself. This is an objective determination, since, in the milieu
of scarcity, the Other is an enemy insofar as he poses a threat "by sharing [one's]
ends and adopting [one's] means" (Sartre 2004:132).
On this level of the analysis, Hell is certainly other people, but only insofar
as our relations to others are embroiled in negative reciprocity. This gives birth
to a Manichaean world-view, where good (us) and evil (them) are constantly in
battle, which, as the origins of this Manichaeaism are ultimately rooted in the
workings of scarcity and the practico-inert, represents "a veritable domination of
man by the interiorised material environment" (Sartre 2004:134). This
constitutes the moral aspect of the ethical, insofar as the interiorized exteriority
presents itself as empty virtues in the practical agent —duties, principles and
precepts that have little to no bearing on actual states of affairs, but refer to an
abstract essence of the good, transcendent and thus outside of the world. The
final movement of ethics is towards the instantiation of positive reciprocity
through praxis working on material reality. An ethical society is one which
structures human relations through the material world so as to both encourage
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and embody positive reciprocity between human beings in a determinate
situation. This would be in contrast to a society founded on the constraint of
freedom, such as societies which are founded on systemic violence and
encourage subjective violence. Thus, to the extent that the present deployment of
material reality and our present technical abilities in terms of the transformation
of material reality cannot obviate scarcity, absolute freedom is impossible today,
and Sartre's statement from Saint Genet about the alienating and mystifying
character of ethics which posit themselves as possible is borne out.
At this moment of the analysis, it would seem that ethical action is
impossible tout court. Those characterizing Sartre as pessimistic would be correct
in terms of his disposition towards current social formations and the state of
justice in the world at present. Pessimism and optimism, though, are futureoriented. One is pessimistic about the state of the world today only to the extent
that it seems that this state will likely lead to a worse state tomorrow. In this
sense, Sartre is far from being a pessimist.
The way that he avoids the pessimism mentioned in the previous chapter
is by means of appeal to the conspicuous exteriority of the imperative.
Imperatives become the crux of Sartre's politics not in the way that they form the
crux of Kant's ethics. Rather than an ethical imperative detached from reality,
we have shown that, for Sartre at least, imperatives and facts are irreducible to
each other but in constant contact. Imperatives can be enforced by strictly
defined sanctions or by diffuse sanctions, relating to institutional sanctions and
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those that arise from mores, respectively. This fact means that there is a collusion
between institutions and mores, each different from the other but building upon
the other. Institutions can enforce and over time create customs or mores and at
the same time, customs and mores help direct institutions —this co-determination
formed a large part of the problem plaguing the rights discourse, which we saw
unfolding in the first chapter in the form of the discord between the pragmatic
concerns of the institution and the normative force of the moral imperative.
Sartre comes to the conclusion that "La pyramide des moeurs et des institutions
constitue l'objet reel de l'éthique" (Simont 1987: 41).
Thus, we can take away a number of insights that will be useful when
deployed within a larger discussion of politics. The first is the difference
between the moral and the ethical. We have seen in this chapter that in order for
there to be any ethical validity to an imperative or any norm, it must be situated
concretely within the bounds of an environment that validates the claim as
ethical. This difference roughly corresponds to that between the imperative and
the value, since values, as interiorizations, do not appear to an agent as specific
to a situation, whereas imperatives, coming prima facie out of a situation, do. This
difference is politically and ethically relevant because the exteriority of the
imperative allows the agent, in disobeying the imperative to act autonomously,
to inventively revolt in an ethical movement which "s'arrache à tout être pour se
projeter dans le devoir-être" (Simont 1987: 42). Since it is this projection into the
devoir-être that gives the historical acts of ethical heroism their ethical sense and
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because these acts are dated and specific to a situation, we see in ethical arguments
which tell us we should ask ourselves "what would Jesus do?" a blindness to
ethical specificity, as we saw in our brief discussion of Kant above. To
understand what is meant here by ethical actions being bound up in their
situational character, think, as an example, of Rosa Parks, who, encountering the
imperative to cede her seat on a bus, projected herself into the devoir-être and
recognized that the imperative was not ethically binding because it must not be.
This action only makes sense within a specific framework, namely that of
segregation.
The second is the structure of ethics as surpassing prior determinations of
the good. This is most evident when the norm encountered is an imperative,
which immediately highlights the agent's freedom in terms of its choice to either
obey or disobey the imperative, a choice that is occluded in the structure of
values. We have shown that the recognition of one's freedom in light of what
might appear as constraints on it is a necessary element of ethical action. This is
to say that though the practico-inert might appear as a real constraint on
situational freedom, ethics comes about through the negation of that apparent
constraint. The practico-inert being essentially negative carries within it the
possibility for an affirmation to arise through its negation, either the negation of
the need that makes the practico-inert appear as a limit to freedom, or a negation
of the practico-inert limitations as such.
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The realm of ethical specificity that Sartre traces out is extremely useful for
the purposes of drawing out the limitations of the current human rights
discourse, insofar as it stresses the situational and specific character of any ethical
or anti-ethical endeavour. We see in the human rights discourse a form devoid
of content, Moralität uncompleted by Sittlichkeit. This distinction adequately
encapsulates the conflation of legality—the form of laws —with that of
legitimacy—their ethical validity. The ethical endeavour in politics, which we
will sketch out in the next chapter, is the process of giving the Moralität of laws
content, of making its empty imperatives situational but not relative. That such
specificity is missing from the human rights discourse and from legal discourse
at large is a key point of contention in our criticisms of the human rights
discourse.

85

Chapter Four: A Sartrean Analysis of Human Rights
"But you, when the time comes at last
And man is a helper to man
Think of us
With forebearance." 11

Introduction: Human Rights, Group Formation and Sartre's Ethics
In this chapter, we will bring together the disparate insights from the
previous chapters, serving as they do as prefatory comments, making this
chapter possible and comprehensible. Two questions will guide our deployment
of concepts and arguments. The first is "why has the human rights discourse
been constitutively unable to provide the protections that it pretends to
guarantee?" and has been partially answered in the first chapter, through a
discussion of the internal contradictions of the rights discourse. We will expand
on and deepen these criticisms in the light of our analyses of ethics and sociality
in the following pages.
The second question, more important by far, is "what can be done?" Note
that this question does not imply necessity: it is not "what must be done?" or
"what shall be done?" Sartre, in his utter realism that is understood by many as
pessimism recognizes that in the social world, the necessary is sometimes made
impossible through the vicissitudes of human inertia and the denial of freedom.
He can thus be understood as easily as a Cassandra as he can a Delphic oracle,
11 Brecht, Bertolt (2003). "An die Nachgeborenen". Bertolt Brecht: Poetry and Prose. Eds. Grimm & Vedia.
New York: Continuum. p75.
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though both are mistaken understandings, as he is not in the business of
providing prophecies, but descriptions. "What can be done?" implies the
freedom of human agents to effect change, but not that this change will take
place rather than another change or no substantive change at all. It also implies a
certain situational limit on freedom, such that we are asking, within a situation
such as ours, what can be done? The answer, as it turns out, is "quite a bit,"
assuming, of course, that we are willing to do it.
In order to understand how the political world should function, one must,
following our line of reasoning, deploy not only an understanding of how
societies operate and change —the insights provided in the CDR —but also how
change ought to occur, in what direction, through what mechanisms and to what
end. For this, we must look to Sartre's ethical ruminations, to be found in the
unpublished Cornell Lectures and Saint Genet. Having classified moral and legal
structures as practico-inert elements of the social world, we will then move
towards a process-oriented view of ethical political action based in active praxis,
which will allow for the negation of certain practico-inert limits to individual and
group praxis in the name of increasing freedom outside of juridical limitations.
We saw, in our discussion of the human rights discourse in the first
chapter how problematic the balancing of the practical and the ethical elements
of legality was for the human rights discourse. In each of the subsequent
chapters, we saw how this imbalance can be accounted for on either side through
the twin misunderstandings of, on the one hand, sociality and on the other,
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ethics. The liberal democratic institution of law, we saw, fails to account for the
embedded character of the individual, its univocity with the social and the
material realms, and its co-determination with other individuals and groups. In
the third chapter, we can see how the liberal democratic impulse to conflate
legality and legitimacy was the effect of a more fundamental impulse to conflate
the empty moral imperatives of Moralität with the concrete and content-full
character of the ethical.
Truly ethical political action, then, would not be politics as individualized
moral habit, mediated through an internalization of institutional imperatives and
values. It would not be the myopic adherence to moral standards born in
another time, born in a situation before those standards were norms. The law,
including the vaunted rights discourse, represents the inert limits of institutional
allowances for action. One can then either internalize these practico-inert
juridical limits as values in order to act in accordance with moral habit, read as to
be moral—one can kneel and move one's lips in prayer in order to believe, as
Pascal would have it—or else radically reconsider these limits and act against
them as an affirmation of radical freedom. This last is the ethical move as long as
the imperatives one is receiving passively from the external world depend on the
limitation of the freedom of the agent—freedom construed as self-regulating and
unconditional for all agents.
Because the reality of human existence is the reality of individual
freedoms interacting with each other in a milieu of scarcity, any free action which

constitutes itself by rendering another un-free, which is to say oppressed, is of
necessity an act not in accordance with one's own freedom. That the human
rights discourse tends towards freedom as a goal is arguable. Certainly, there are
discursive elements in the many declarations of human rights which pay lip
service to freedom as a value: freedom of choice, conscience, movement,
association, and expression are all inscribed as fundamental in various rights
documents, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These
proclamations of freedom, however, as institutional imperatives, secure nothing
but the normative claims necessary for a certain established way of life, and may
not operate in accordance with the ethical imperative to be free. That is to say
that the juridical imperatives of the state do not necessarily overlap with the
ethical imperative, that the force of the institution can be brought down on one
for an act no more harmful than crossing the street at a red light. These laws
stem from practico-inert determinations of the good, from past determinations of
the good projected into a future where the situation has changed, sometimes
beyond recognition.
The moral example—Rosa Parks or Jesus as a model for action—cannot be
taken as an embodiment of an inert, universal and replicable moral code, because
such codes construct the good as transcendent, whereas in a materialist and
dialectical ethic, the good must be conceived of as both immanent to the world
and specific to a situation in history. Sartre makes an ironic comment about the
moral example in his Cornell Lectures, referring to moral exemplification as the
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secular version of divine grace —which is already a stern condemnation,
considering Sartre's opinion of such religious mythologies. He goes on to
elaborate: examples when taken as models, " s'aliènenent à des obligations inertes et
particularisent l'universel en refusant de voir la singularité" (Sartre 1964:401). The
good comes into the world situationally, through the human being, through a
particular deployment of social and historical facts that makes an action —which
would, outside of this situation, considered on its own, be equivocal—ethical.
Taking the content of a moral example of someone who acted ethically in
the past as a guideline for action would thus be to disconnect the action and its
ethical character from the situation, to evacuate the ethical of its specificity, its
singularity. The moral example, then, shows us not how to act, but that ethics "a
été 'réalisé', et peut encore l'être" (Simont 1987: 43). It is a symbol and a promise:
ethics has been realized, and can be again. But it is the form of this birthing of
ethics that is important to ethical thought and action, not the content, which is
parasitical on a determinate situation. This is the case because the specificity of
the moral example comes from its bucking of practico-inert norms. When one
systematizes this example, one in effect renders it inert.
Advances in human rights have been nothing other than exemplary. The
two-fold meaning of this last sentence implies the entire issue at stake. We can
say that advances in human rights and the benefits they have brought have been
exemplary in terms of the net gains in practical freedom that they represent.
Where dictatorships have crumbled either through the external imposition of

90

human rights regimes or through the cultural appropriation of human rights as a
value, we can say that these have been ethical. On the other hand, the advances
made by the human rights discourse have been nothing but exemplary. The
advances in human rights do not prove that the rights and freedoms stipulated
by any particular juridical interpretation of human rights have been the ethically
correct ones. Rather, what all the advances brought by the human rights
discourse show us is that, insofar as practical freedom edged an inch or a metre
closer to being unconstrained for all ethical and political agents, these rights have
produced a more ethical situation than before. Ethical action was realized, and it
can be again.
If one takes the inert limits presented by the juridical framework which
stipulates that the state will loosen its grip on individual freedom, its practicoinert and conventional impediments to freedom, as inert and stationary, one is
implicitly expressing either fatalism—this state of affairs is wrong, but can be
made no better by one's actions —or else that this state of affairs is, in fact, the
best of all possible worlds. On the one hand, one can see the lack of faith in
man's practical ability to effect change, whereas on the other hand, one can see
the lack of faith in the ability of the material world to be changed. These are two
sides of the same coin, namely the strange and alienating currency of
internalized practico-inertia.
As an inert and alienating juridical framework of imperatives given
externally to agents through an institution, where the freedom of agents fails to

realize itself as anything other than the flight to the Other, the human rights
discourse has been successful. That is to say, the human rights discourse has
been very successful at creating conditions where freedom is no longer the
moment "of the action, but that of the materialised result; it is no longer the
positive moment in which one does, but the negative moment in which one is
produced in passivity by what the practico-inert ensemble makes out of what
one has just made" (Sartre 2004; 337). As a discourse at the service of freedom as
such, and thus at the service of the flourishing of the individual and the creation
of positive reciprocities, the human rights discourse has failed. Through the
coercive mechanisms of the institution, that is, through the concentration of
power in a sovereign and the serialization of its members as we saw in the
second chapter, the state maintains its monopoly on freedom.
In concrete terms, we can see this operation in the liberal democratic
human rights discourse in terms of the ways that it isolates individuals as selfcontained monadic subjects. We saw this individualizing operation in the first
chapter, and saw how it constitutes a false representation of the individual in the
second chapter. Through the individualizing aspects of the human rights
discourse, the state employs, as a strategy aimed towards its own persistence, the
monopoly of the institution over the freedom of its members. We recognize,
then, that the state as it stands manifests its duplicitous nature through the
human rights discourse: it claims to embody social relations, yet, through its
mediation of social and political relations, reifies freedom as something inert—

statutory, fixed in law—and monopolizes it as something that is of and for the
state. Freedom becomes something granted by the state and at the service of the
state. In fact, the claim to represent social relations, when accepted, is the
mechanism by which the state institutes negative reciprocity.
That rights have progressed historically, that new regimes of rights and
ways of understanding rights have sometimes led to a net gain of practical
freedom can be seen in multiple arenas, wherever the juridical power of a state
has been constrained to the benefit of the freedom of its subjects. We see in
monarchies, where the freedom of the monarch depends on the radical un
freedom of the subjects, the same basic structure as in colonization, where the
oppressor both depends on the oppressed and seeks their destruction. The
erosion of monarchies in favour of liberal democracies or republics was not an
absolute good, insofar as the relation between the parts of society and the whole
of society continue under this new formulation to be mediated by the state,
rendering the citizens an inert, serial multiplicity12. This nonetheless
represented progress in terms of the form that mediation took: government in
liberal democracy, set up as it may be to protect the status quo regardless of the
justice of the status quo, is nonetheless responsible to the polity in a much more
palpable way than is an absolute monarch. In order to effect at least nominal
12 That is, the citizens qua citizens are a serial multiplicity. It is quite possible that in other social
groupings, the relations between members of those groups—knitting circles, book clubs, underground
fight clubs, professional groups, trade unions, and the list could continue endlessly—are not that of inert
seriality, but of another type of social formation. The question of the multiplicity of social formations of
which we are all a part complicates the issue needlessly for this analysis of basic sociality, and therefore
will be largely ignored for the purposes of clarity and parsimony.
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political change within a monarchy, the polity must impress upon the monarch a
sense of exigency; assuming the monarch is opposed to a certain political
program, the polity must show that there could be a revolt, or that the kingdom
would crumble lest change be implemented. In liberal democracies, on the other
hand, the polity need only convince a legislator that he or she might turn public
opinion against him- or herself, which would likely end in his or her expulsion
from government come the next vote.
Where this becomes a problem is when a certain political regime,
admittedly not perfect, is posited as the end of politics. That is to say, the
problem is not that liberal democracies are the worst thing to ever occur in
history—far better to live under President Bush the Younger than under Stalin—
but that this system becomes internalized as the practico-inert limit of all possible
politics. Something like this argument was put forward, a number of years ago,
by Francis Fukuyama, in his essay-turned-book The End o f History and the Last
Man, where Fukuyama, having completely internalized that which is as that
which must be, predicts the ultimate triumph of liberalism over all other
ideological strains, calling it the "end point of man's ideological evolution"
(Fukuyama 1992: xi).
While it is possibly true that economic and political liberalism may be the
end point of man's ideological evolution, there is nothing to say that this need be
the case. Humanity may cease to exist tomorrow and stop ideologically
evolving, for instance, but in absence of that, there is nothing to say that
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liberalism should maintain its hegemonic grip as the untranscendable limit of
political formations. Fukuyama's formulation implies that there can be no higher
stage, no later stage of history than economic and political liberalism, and such a
formulation is formally indefensible unless one can predict the future, for it is
hardly a foregone conclusion that at some time, another form of the state might
emerge.
Liberal democracy is not necessarily the end of history, then. It is
certainly deeply entrenched, which is to say that it has become a practico-inert
fact of our existence, rather than something that takes massive amounts of energy
to maintain. But this inertia inherent in the liberal democratic deployment of the
state is no more necessary or unsurpassable than monarchy was, or than any
social fact is. Even the most deeply entrenched social and political formations
exist through the power and at the whim of individual and group praxis. When
Fukuyama sees in liberal democracy the untranscendable end of history, what he
is really expressing is his impotence to change the system —whether he wills it or
not, the liberal democratic system represents the end of human ideological
evolution. Experiencing this impotence, which is to say, being overwhelmed by
the practico-inert and denying one's own freedom, one might as well become a
supporter of the status quo: "Since it cannot be changed, it is just as well that I am
willing to go along with it" (Sartre 2004: 602). Although comprehensible under
Sartre's analysis, this attitude shows itself as false, a denial of freedom, a lightly
masked flight to the Other. This flight to the Other is the hypostasis of the liberal
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democratic rights discourse, wherein the perceived inability to change the system
or to act outside of the state manifests itself as complacency rather than revolt,
the becoming-inert of praxis rather than the dismantling of repressive inert
structures.
This flight is a structural effect, an epiphenomenon of seriality. The
practico-inert can exert resistance to active organic praxis. One effect of this
practico-inert resistance is the facilitation of living as though society were merely
an additive or aggregate totality, that is to say, a serial multiplicity. For seriality
to exist, individuals must have no project that requires either group co
ordination or a substantive change in social relations. Such an atomized
existence only becomes a problem when the exigencies of scarcity or an external
determination make the maintenance of the status quo impossible. The status quo
becomes the sign of the "impossibility of living" if the status quo is maintained
(Sartre 2004: 341). Any ethical program of rights would aim itself at upsetting
such serial multiplicities, given the fact that they represent man as inert, as
object, as radically un-free, and because through this representation, which
manifests itself as a bad-faith worldview, man becomes inert objectively.
We concluded the first chapter with the statement that the rights discourse
has failed to adequately balance the practical demands of the implantation of
programs of rights against the normative aspect of what rights ought to do. We
saw in the second chapter that the history of society is a process of totalizations
of human praxis, of the emergence of groups aimed at their own emancipation
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and their falls back into seriality. In the previous chapter, we have shown that
ethics involves the overcoming of practico-inert moral superstructures, structures
of the right which come out of past praxis. Collapsing these three insights, we
can say that Dershowitz was correct in emphasizing the process-oriented nature
of the rights discourse. Where Dershowitz went wrong —amongst the other
errors he made, which we pointed out in our criticisms of him in the first
chapter—was by not applying his process-oriented approach to the structure of
the rights discourse itself.
It is not only the content of the imperatives given by the political or social
system at any time that must be considered a process of righting and thus
constantly re-evaluated, but the method of their delivery, the standards by which
they are enforced, and the ways in which they engage agents. Certainly, there
are problems with the content of certain rights and the absence of others, but the
state, as an institution aimed primarily at its own persistence, cannot acquiesce to
freely deliver onto its subjects the power it has found for itself—it will not
"gradually abandon its monopoly o f the group" (Sartre 2004: 661). The same
arguments that lent themselves to a critique of the bureaucratization of Soviet
society in the second chapter are no less valid arguments against the
bureaucratization of liberal democracies, though the violence involved in the
latter case may be less harsh or less visible. As mentioned above, this does not
detract from the ethical superiority of liberal democracy over certain other
systems: it merely represents the fact that liberal democracies inculcate and

reflect in their structure the alienation of their subjects, the concentration of
productive and political power, and the oppression of the Third-World
subproletariat. In the terminology developed earlier, this corresponds to the fact
that both Soviet Communism and liberal democracy manifest themselves as
institutions. Though the particular ways in which these institutions serialise the
agents which are a part of them differ, both manifest themselves as the alienation
of praxis from the particular agent, and the location of power and freedom in the
state. The human rights discourse serves its role here well, characterising rights
as an essential aspect of the human being rather than something which must be
practically engaged with, a correlate of being rather than action, practico-inert
rather than active praxis. In short, the human rights discourse is one more means
by which the state diverts the freedom of agents within it to practico-inert
allowances.
That one would claim that the ethical superiority of liberal democracy
over, for example, Soviet Communism exculpates liberal democracies from
substantive criticisms regarding their structure is casuistic, and thus
contradictory: "le casuiste ne fait rien d'autre que de vivre à la fois sous deux régimes
éthiques different" (Simont 1987: 44). This is Fukuyama's ethical error, in addition
to his metaphysical errors. Fukuyama, in his split consciousness, is living at the
same time under two opposing ethical systems: the consequentialist view, which
states that since capitalist liberal democratic societies have provided the best
results so far, they are the best; and the deontological view, which states,

disregarding both inclinations and outcomes, that liberal democracy is the only
system under which we can act according to our moral duties. All of this is
based on a contingent history of politics which has seen liberalism improve on
other systems, projected into a future which does not admit of any alternatives.
Surprisingly, Fukuyama later corrects this mistake in Our Posthuman Future,
rightly claiming that liberal democracy is not necessarily the end point of human
ideological evolution, on account of continuing advances in science and
technology that could radically alter humanity's relationship with scarcity,
though he does not phrase this relation to scarcity explicitly in the same terms as
Sartre. It is, however, no great leap to translate the main thesis of Fukuyama's
Our Posthuman Future into Sartrean terms. The advances in science and
technology obviate the need for the nation state and certain forms of social
morality, which were based in prior technological and material limitations; this is
Fukuyama's thesis. In Sartre's terms from the CDR, this is no different than
saying that human praxis exerts force on the practico-inert for increased technical
ability to modify the world and cope with scarcity, negating through praxis the
practico-inert social forms that gave rise to our current social and political
determinations, whose roots are in scarcity and prior practico-inert
determinations.
The Shape of what is to Come: Rights after Sartre
If the shape of what comes after the human rights discourse as it currently
stands seems nebulous or, worse yet, vacuous, that is because there is no more

arrogant position than that of claiming to be the subject who knows everything.
No person, not the Delphic oracle or the Amazing Kreskin, can know how the
dialectic of individual praxis will play out in a world where everything resists it,
especially considering Sartre's fallibilist account of praxis as having "ignorance
and error" as basic structures. If our own praxis is unclear to us and the social
structures in which we exist are no more translucent, then the honest picture of
the future must be painted in broad, tentative strokes. Yet, the nature of praxis is
that it is formed out of and informed by its exterior; its possibilities for creation
are inscribed in the negation of those social and material worlds in which it
exists. As such, a broad trajectory can be discerned, where change that does not
amount to the liquidation of resistors —the trajectory taken by Soviet
Communism—is possible as a more liberating social formation than the practicoinert liberties of liberalism.
If the next step in political evolution is present in a nascent form in the
world today, we have the benefit, as participants in and observers of
contemporary society, of both seeing it in action and being a part of it. The
necessary conditions of a new political formation that is neither atavistic nor
regressive are that it reduces the claims that the state can legitimately make
against free organic praxis that does not limit the freedom of other agents and
that it introduces positive reciprocity between ethical and political agents. That
is, the new political formation that we are referring to would structure social
relations in terms of something like solidarity or fraternity.

A political formation based on solidarity or what might be termed
fraternity would of necessity divest itself of the practico-inert form of human
rights, tied as it is to the practico-inert form of liberal democracy. Where such a
political formation can be seen, I argue, is in the cooperative movement. Stone
and Bowman point to the evolution over the last century of a plethora of
cooperative communities engaging in economic democracy, which seem to be
undercutting the necessity of the capitalist class —as it does not provide "a
distinct contribution to production" (Stone and Bowman 2005: 9, emphasis
original). The unification of producers, managers and owners in co-ops reveals
itself as an alternative to capital growing within the practico-inert limits
necessary to capitalism. Should these endeavours succeed, the nation-state as a
law-giver will no longer prove necessary —if it was ever necessary —to the
flourishing of man in social and economic terms. Such a system does not require
the creation ex nihilo of new social forms, as the cooperative movement is based
on and immanent to capitalist forms of production, which the legal
superstructure is built to maintain (Stone and Bowman 2005:19).
The most politically mobile aspect of the cooperative movement, one that
can be operationalized in the wider political sphere and not just the economic, is
that the sharing of labour involved in the constitution of a cooperative is such
that it "makes identifying one's piece impossible" (Bowman and Stone 2005: 223). In a word, cooperatives force solidarity, and bring to the forefront the idea
that Sartre implies in his social and political mereology: that as we live in a

shared world, our fates are inter-dependent. This fact, occluded in the hyper
individualization of liberal subjects, is one that must allow for the emancipation
of all members, to the benefit of all members, and at the expense of none. Rather
than looking to maximize profits, cooperatives seek to meet needs, and this shift
is supported by the structure of mutual gifting (of labour, time and profits, for
example) and thus the inculcation of ethical bonds of positive reciprocity (Stone
and Bowman 2005: 23). This not only solves the contradiction in capitalism of
individual greed becoming collective gain, but grounds the faith in collective
gain in the concrete experience that in the cooperative structure, recalling Sartre's
description of the group-in-fusion, working for one's own gain is working for the
collective gain, everyone has the experience of "personally benefiting as a result
of benefits to one's group," as demanded by the structure of social relations
within the cooperative (Bowman and Stone 2005: 24). The reference here to the
group-in-fusion is more than merely a superficial homology, as the types of
social relations in the co-operative are such that individual members are not
differentiated in terms of their utility to the group, nor stratified in terms of their
power over the group. Each works for all, and reaps rewards on the basis of this
collective undertaking. In a limited sense, the members of cooperatives today are
the products of their own actions without being totalized from the outside as
something they do not wish to be. Group decisions are not left to some distinct
executive body, seen as external to the rest of the membership; rather, the
membership constitutes the governing body.
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Exporting this to the political realm as a whole, the aim of politics should
be to create something like this integral humanity, which is the product solely of
its own actions and not held, serialized and isolated, at the whims of a
government which totalizes it and vampirizes its freedom. Thus, human rights
should not be dictated from an external source such as the government, which
claims in the name of an imaginary totality the role of God, the role of being able
to define and stipulate the natural rights of humankind. Rather, human rights
must, if freedom is to be at all really existent in the world, be the products of
communal and cooperative action on the part of people who recognize that
immanence which constitutes humanity as the products of its own actions and
recognizes that oppression in any quantity is the negation of everyone's freedom.
Human rights, in short, must share the cooperative outlook, the
identification of one's own gain with the collective gain, grounded in a concrete
experience of such an interdependence. Violence, in terms of the liquidation of le
contre-homme, is always legitimated as "counter-violence" and productive of
more violence in terms of the negative reciprocities thereby engendered (Sartre
2004:133). If human rights are to exist as something substantive, rather than
merely formal, scarcity must be managed communally, needs engendered
through scarcity and the practico-inert must be met communally, and the liberal
isolation of the subject must, therefore, be liquidated. Not only have the
attempts of liberal democracies to address poor social conditions and violence
been largely unsuccessful, late or anaemic, but Sartre's analysis of the series
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shows that the root of much of the violence one encounters today comes from the
fact that within the series, man presents himself to others as the contre-homme.
Only then will the practical concerns of the implementation of social relations
engendering rights and freedoms be balanced against, and in fact constitute, the
implementation, read creation, of an ethical social order. That the liberal
democratic human rights discourse does not adequately perform in terms of
these necessities is a function of the serialisation that occurs within the state. We
saw in the first chapter that the logic of the human rights discourse is aggregative
or additive: Hobbes speaks of the individuals in the state of nature coming
together to secure their individual security; Dershowitz speaks of groups only in
terms of their individual members, and so on. These forms of rights describe
relationships of obedience and power—the power of the state to make an agent
obey—and thus are nothing more than the formal institution o f negative reciprocity.
In short, then, positive reciprocity and a human rights discourse with
content can only come about when the false mediation of the state ceases to
impede the relation of each to all. For such a future to be possible, citizens must,
through their communities, create groups which obviate the perceived need for
the state. Only when such a time comes can the institutional stranglehold on the
individual be obviated. Once this has occurred, one can begin to consider human
freedom outside of the abstract universal normative requirements of the legal
discourse and begin to consider human freedom in terms of concrete situational
requirements. The human rights discourse, then, can serve as an example. We

have witnessed more unethical legal formations in the past, and the human
rights discourse, insofar as it proscribes certain forms of egregious violence, has
been an improvement, at least on the formal level. As we have shown, though,
the specificity of the ethical comes from its tendency to surpass earlier structures
of practico-inert social norms. Freedom can only exist within a political structure
on the condition that the political structure acknowledges its own radical
contingency, and the situational origin of its mandates. The situational
derivation of ethics reveals nothing if not that what the right thing to do is
depends on an entire set of situational factors. The corollary of this situational
derivation is that what the right thing to do is will change depending on the
characteristics of the situation, thus the possibility of changing the affordances
given within a political structure is a necessary component of an ethical politics.
This is the nature of the cooperative movement, where the goal of association is
non-coercive collective benefit. Any imperative given in a cooperative is subject
to the approval of all members, and can thus be evaluated in terms of their
specific situation. In short, the putative goal of the liberal democratic human
rights discourse is the reality of the cooperative.
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Conclusion: Faut-il bruler Sartre?
Sartre was always wrong on politics. This is a common estimation of the
French philosopher's political acumen in many circles, especially given his
association with the French Maoist movement in his later life. His massive
treatise on socio-political formations, the Critique o f Dialectical Reason, fell flat
with a deafening thud shortly after the first volume was published. The
demonstrations in Paris in 1968, which Sartre supported, also failed to produce
anything more substantial than the careers of certain other French intellectuals,
who rode the shockwave of these demonstrations to relative prosperity.
All of that is in the past, now. The questions that many people may ask
after having read this are similar to the questions posed by a number of the
people who have shared a bed with Sartre: "What did I just do, and why did I do
it with Sartre?" What, specifically, does Sartre provide an analysis of the human
rights discourse that others could not? One would hope that the answer to such
a question would be evident after having read the rest of this work. If it is not
apparent, then allow us to summarize his utility to our project.
First and foremost, the Critique o f Dialectical Reason provides us with an
elaborate account of group formation that incorporates his earlier existentialist
emphasis on the free individual as well as the Marxist insights regarding
structural effects. Moreover, Sartre performs in this text the astounding feat of
not reducing one to the other, of not saying structure is an effect of individual
freedom or that the actions of the individual are structurally determined.
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Instead, the two terms inflect and infect each other, dissolve into each other in a
way that is productive to both macro- and microcosmic analyses of society.
Sartre's dialectical impulse is thus shown not to be a simple formal necessity of
his Marxist leanings, but a crucial element of his theory whose necessity is not
assumed, but continually put to test in the CDR.
Secondly, Sartre is helpful because of his later ethical writings. One can
see in the Cornell Lectures an honest and astute account of ethical experience,
and a fruitful attempt to come to an account of ethics that would be both
substantive and in line with Sartre's other theories. The notion of ethics as a
process of overcoming the practico-inert moral superstructure, drawing
increasingly large spheres of practical freedom, is something that takes into
account both the pragmatic and the moral, a balancing of what one ought to do it
a perfect world against what is actually possible in a concrete situation.
Taken together, these insights allow one to formulate a theory of rights
quite different than what is meant by "human rights" today. I argue that the
goals of the human rights discourse cannot be met due to the form of the
discourse and its subjugation to the whims of the state. The formal structure of
legal discourse is universalized statements, applicable equally to all, categorical
and thus without specific content. I argue that because of this, human rights
cannot achieve anything ethical, or if it does, it does so partially and by accident.
A different form of the state would be necessary if freedom is to be conserved as
a value, and it must if politics is not to be regressive, totalitarian, or Evil.
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A continual overcoming of practico-inert superstructures is what is called
for, insofar as these practico-inert superstructures form a barrier to active praxis.
In order to achieve this, agents must both be cognizant of these superstructures
and see themselves as in a position to change them. The human rights discourse
as it stands does not fulfill either of these conditions, as we have seen. The
human rights discourse in its current formulation opts to hide both the
contingency of state mandates and the power of agents and groups to change the
layout of social relations. It does this, as we have seen, by appealing to natural
law—claiming that rights are essential to man, no matter how recently these
rights have sprung up or what historical contingency has spurred their
creation—and by claiming that rights inhere in isolated individuals—occluding
the social character of individuality and the possibility for solidarity. As such,
the discourse sets up a false relation between individuals, mediated by the state,
in which freedom is strictly confined to an area that fits neatly within the
ideological coordinates of the state.
Without Sartre's CDR, one might be able to advance similar claims, but
one could not necessarily make them intelligible. With Sartre's unique approach
to the social sphere, what I have termed his "critical social mereology," he bucks
the constraints imposed by the liberal democratic institution of rights, even as he
explains to limits of its intelligibility. This double utility, Sartre's critical ability
and his motions towards an alternative, constitute both the "what?" and "why?"
of my use of Sartre.
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